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A SHORT CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENTITIES COMMONLY KNOWN
AS AUTHORITIES
William .. Quirkt and Leon E. Weinff
In 1858 a petition was presented to the New York legislature re-
questing the calling of a new constitutional convention. The petition
recited that the convention should abolish the executive and legislative
branches of government and vest all of those powers in the President,
Vice President, and Board of Directors of the New York Central Rail-
road. This, the petitioners believed, would only formalize the existing
state of affairs and would relieve the people from the large amounts
unnecessarily spent to sustain the executive and legislative departments.
The call for a new convention was submitted to the people and was
narrowly defeated.'
This extraordinary gesture reflects, in a radical way, a continuing
theme of New York's constitutional history-the desire to curb legis-
lative abuses. The original New York constitution was a comparatively
simple and concise document that imposed only slight restraints on the
exercise of legislative power. New York's present constitution, however,
contains numerous and precise limitations on the legislature's substan-
tive powers as well as its procedures. The development of the constitu-
tion from a simple to a complex document, which this article will trace,
is largely attributable to repeated efforts on the part of constitutional
conventions to correct a particular source of abuse-the legislature's
ability to create state indebtedness. All too often, the legislative response
t Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. A.B. 1956, Princeton Uni-
versity; LL.B. 1959, University of Virginia.
-t Instructor in Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. 1961, Brooklyn College; LL.B. 1966,
New York University; Dip. Law 1966, Cambridge University.
1 2 C. LINCOLN, Tim CONsrrrToNAL HISTORY Or Naw YoRK 233-34 (1906) [herein-
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CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:521
has been to seek ways in which to subvert the limitations placed upon
it. The legislature's most recent response is to use entities known as
authorities as debt-evading devices.
I
EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The 1777 Convention
The first constitution of New York was adopted by convention on
April 20, 1777, and, although conceived in haste because of war-imposed
pressures, it remained the state's fundamental law for forty-five years. 2
Authored by John Jay, the constitution created a bicameral legislature
with power vested in a Senate and an Assembly.3 A veto power over
legislation was placed in a Council of Revision composed of the Gover-
nor, the Chancellor, and the judges of the supreme court.4 All bills
passed by the legislature were to be submitted to the Council for their
"revisal and consideration." 5 If the Council found the bill "improper,"
it was to be returned to the legislature with the Council's written objec-
tions.6 The legislature, after consideration of the Council's objections,
could enact the bill into law by a two-thirds vote.7 The only substantive
limitations imposed on the legislature were of a bill of rights nature;8
2 1 id. at 558. The first constitution was not submitted to the people. The Convention
was specifically empowered to create a constitution and the people did not reserve the
right to ratify its work. Id. at 481-83. For a general discussion of the 1777 Convention,
see J. DOUGHERTY, CONSTITUTiONAL HIsToRY OF THE STATE OF NEw YoX a 46-57 (1915).
8 N.Y. CONSr. art. II (1777) provided:
This convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of the good
people of this state, ORDAIN, DETERMINE AND DECLARE, That the supreme
legislative power within this state, shall be vested in two separate and distinct
bodies of men; the one to be called the assembly of the state of New York; the
other to be called the senate of the state of New York; who, together, shall
form the legislature, and meet once at least in every year for the despatch of
business.
4 Id. art. III.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. A bill would also become law if the Council failed to return it to the legisla-
ture within 10 days after submission. Id.
8 The free exercise of religion was not to be interfered with (id. art. XXXVIII);
trial by jury was to "remain inviolate forever" (id. art. XLI); and bills of attainder
were generally forbidden (id.). Curiously, the constitution permitted bills of attainder
for crimes committed prior to the end of "the present war." Id. But in no event was
such a bill to "work a corruption of blood." Id.
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the procedural limitations imposed on the legislature were similarly
slight.9 The state's original constitution, then, created a legislature that
was free to act with few constraints.
The original constitution contained no provision for its amend-
ment or for the calling of a new constitutional convention. In 1820 the
legislature passed a bill recommending a new constitutional convention
be held and providing for the election of delegates.10 The bill was vetoed
by the Council of Revision on the ground that the legislature had no
authority to call a convention. The Council's objections, reported by
Chancellor Kent, noted that it "may well be doubted whether it belongs
to the ordinary legislature-chosen only to make laws in pursuance of
the provisions of the existing Constitution-to call a convention ....",,
The Council therefore concluded that the question of a general consti-
tutional revision should be submitted to the people in the first in-
stance. 12 The bill was subsequently reconsidered by the legislature but
failed to receive the two-thirds vote needed to override the Council's
veto.13 In 1821 the question of calling a convention was submitted to
the people.14
B. The 1821 Convention
The 1821 Convention, among other things, (1) abolished the Coun-
cil of Revision, transferring the veto power to the Governor;' 5 (2) sub-
stantially relaxed property qualifications with respect to suffrage; 16 and
(3) expanded the number of specific bill of rights provisions.' 7 Of most
interest for our purposes, the Convention adopted provisions governing
canal policy which placed limits on the legislature's power. By 1821
0 The style of the enacting clause was prescribed (id. art. XXXI); the legislature
was required to keep and publish a journal of its proceedings (id. art. XV); and the
doors of both the Senate and Assembly were to be "at all times ...kept open to all
persons" unless the welfare of the state required secrecy (id.).
10 1 L NCOLN 623-24.
11 Id. at 625.
12 Id. at 626.
13 Id. at 628.
14 Act of March 13, 1821, ch. 90, [1821] N.Y. Laws 83.
15 N.Y. CoNsr. art. I, § 12 (1821). The debates of the 1821 Convention are found
in A REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEw
YoRK, 1821 (L. Clarke ed. 1821) [hereinafter cited as 1821 DEBATES]. For a general dis-
cussion of the 1821 Convention, see J. DOUGHERTY, supra note 2, at 100-39; 2 J. HAII OND,
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1-85 (4th ed. 1850).
16 N.Y. CONsT. art. 11 (1821).
17 The 1821 constitution expressly included freedom of speech and of the press (id.
art. VII, § 8), due process requirements, and a provision that "private property [shall
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation" (id. § 7).
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the canal question had already had a fairly extensive history of state
and federal involvement. Its subsequent history was to have a critical
effect on constitutional development leading directly to the radical
reforms of later constitutional conventions.
President Jefferson, in his 1806 message to Congress, suggested
the use of federal funds for such important internal improvements as
"roads and canals.""' New York attempted to secure such aid for canal
construction and sent DeWitt Clinton and Gouverneur Morris to
Washington in 1812 for that purpose.19 Congress, however, refused
to become involved in the project, and the state determined to proceed
with the construction on its own credit.20 In 1816 the legislature ap-
pointed five individuals as Canal Commissioners to "consider, devise
and adopt" such measures as might be needed to effect the construction
of canals between the Hudson River and Lake Erie and the Hudson
River and Lake Champlain. 21 These commissioners were authorized
to undertake all necessary surveys and plans for the canal construction,22
and to make applications to the federal government for grants or do-
nations.23 In addition, they were to ascertain in what amounts and upon
what terms, loans could be "procured on the credit of this state."24
In 1817 the canal commissioners were empowered by statute to
"commence making the said canals." 25 The same statute created a canal
fund under the jurisdiction of a separate group of commissioners known
as the Commissioners of the Canal Fund.26 These commissioners were
authorized to borrow "monies on the credit of the people of this state,
at a rate of interest not exceeding six percentum." 27 To evidence such
loans, the Comptroller was directed to issue "transferable certificates
of stock." 28 In addition to the borrowing power, several other sources
of income were appropriated to the canal fund.29 The Canal Fund
Commissioners were authorized to provide funds to the Commissioners
of the Canal as necessary for the construction of the canal, and the latter
18 1 LINCOLN 700.
19 Id. at 704.
20 Id. at 705.
21 Act of April 17, 1816, di. 237, § 1, [1816] N.Y. Laws 295.
22 Id. § 3.
23 Id. § 4, [1816] N.Y. Laws 296.
24 Id.
25 Act of April 15, 1817, ch. 262, § 2, [1817] N.Y. Laws 302.
26 Id. § 1, [1817] N.Y. Laws 301.
27 Id.
28 Id. The reference to state "stock" is to be understood as a reference to a debt
instrument.
29 Id. §§ 4-5, 7. [1817] N.Y. Laws 803-05.
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commissioners, when the canal became operable, were required to
establish reasonable tolls for the benefit of the canal fund.30
As the Convention met, the main canal between Lake Erie and
the Hudson River was in the process of construction. Projections for
the canal's success tended to be optimistic. Governor DeWitt Clinton,
for example, stated that the debt incurred for the canal would be retired
within a few years by the revenues produced; these would then become
a "prolific source of revenue for the general purposes of government."31
The canal policy, as statutorily established, was agreeable to the
Convention. The question to the Convention was whether the policy
should be left to legislative discretion or fixed in the new constitution.
Some delegates believed the legislature could be trusted to act appro-
priately in the public interest and thought it a mistake to fix a canal
policy beyond its control.3 2 The majority of the delegates, however,
fearful that funds might be diverted from the payment of the canal
debt, determined that the existing policy should be constitutionally
protected.3 3 The constitution therefore provided that the existing toll
schedules established by the Canal Commissioners could not be re-
duced.3 4 It further provided that there be "inviolably appropriated"
to the payment of the canal debt: (1) the canal tolls, (2) the salt duty,
(3) the auction duty, and (4) the "in lieu of" tax on steamboat passen-
gers.35 In addition, it was expressly provided that "the legislature shall
never sell, or dispose of" the canals.30
30 Id. § 2, [1817] N.Y. Laws 302.
31 1 LINCOLN 708-09. Governor Clinton, in his 1818 message to the legislature,
noted the public purpose to be served by the canal and predicted its eventual profit-
ability:
The internal trade of a country is equally essential to the prosperity of
agriculture, of manufactures, and of commerce; for, embracing the interests of
all, it extends its enlivening influence to every important department of human
industry . . . and it is among the first duties of government to facilitate the
transportation of commodities ... for, in peace or in war, it is equally essential
to our cardinal interests.
With respect to the debt which will be incurred in the prosecution of in-
ternal improvements, there can be no doubt but that light tolls on our own
commodities, and higher transit duties on foreign productions, will, in a few
years, not only accumulate a fund for its extinguishment, but be a prolific
source of revenue for the general purposes of government.
Id.
32 Id. at 714.
33 Id.
34 N.Y. CONsr. art. VII, § 10 (1821).
35 Id.
36 Id. The canals were completed within a few years of the Convention-the Cham-
plain Canal in 1824 and the Erie Canal in 1825. 1 LINcoLN 712-13.
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II
THE 1846 CONVENTION
The state's next constitutional convention was not held until
1846. By that time the state had amassed a debt of $38,000,000.37 The
success of the Erie Canal-completed in 1825-had led the state, and
indeed the country, into a wave of public improvement construction.38
The burden of these improvements fell upon the states since the na-
tional government generally chose to avoid involvement. 9 In New York
the construction of a group of subsidiary canals was undertaken.40 In
addition, the state had embarked on a program of giving its credit to
railroads. 41 With the Panic of 1837 and the general improvidence of
its investments, the state ran into hard times. In 1842 Comptroller
Flagg reported that the state was pressed "to the very brink of dishonor
and bankruptcy."42
New York was not alone in its difficulties; public improvements
had been enthusiastically undertaken by many other states as well. By
1842 the states had incurred debts of over $200,000,000, most of which
were unsecured.43 In 1790 the federal government had assumed the
debts of the states. 44 It was now proposed that the federal government
37 People v. Westchester County Natl Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 471-72, 132 N.E. 241, 243
(1921).
38 H. ADAMS, PUBLIC DEBTS 329-30 (1895) [hereinafter cited as ADAMS]; N.Y. STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION CoMM., REPbRT: PROBLEMS RELATING TO TAXATION AND
FINANCE 85 & n.7 (1938) [hereinafter cited as TAXATION & FINANCE]. The Erie Canal
had not only been a success, but its revenue projections had proven accurate. ADAMS 829.
39 For example, President Jackson vetoed the Maysville and Lexington road bill,
refusing to allow any federal internal improvements until the national debt was paid
and the Constitution amended to authorize explicitly the expenditure of federal funds
for public works. 3 J. PARTON, LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 285 (1861).
40 As of 1882, when canal tolls were abolished, all of the state's significant canals,
with the exception of the original Erie, had lost money. N.Y. STATE COMM. ON CANALS,
REPORT, 1900 N.Y. ASSEMBLY Doc. No. 79, at 151 (table 1).
41 It is not argued that such gifts of credit did not fulfill a public purpose. In
People v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 475, 182 N.E. 241, 244 (1921),
the Court of Appeals noted: "Gifts of credit to railroads served an important public
purpose." See also Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, 18 N.Y. 88 (1858); Clarke v.
Rochester, 24 Barb. 446, 456, 481 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857), aff'd, 28 N.Y. 605 (1864).
42 D. SowEas, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF NEW YoRK STATE FROM 1789 TO 1912, at
70 (1914).
The Comptroller's Report stated: "The impulse for internal improvement and
local interests regardless of the condition of the finances has pressed the state to the
very brink of dishonor and bankruptcy." Id.
43 ADAMS 881.
44 Adams points out that assumption was appropriate in that instance since debts
incurred in the Revolutionary War were in reality federal debts. Id. at 532. .
[Vol. 56:521
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again do the same. The assumption scheme contemplated the distribu-
tion of $200,000,000 of United States stock among the states. 45- The
federal government, however, had avoided undertaking these internal
improvements in the first instance and had no desire to become involved
now that state policy had failed.46
Aid to private enterprise was another aspect of the state's problem.
The largest single gift of state credit was for the benefit of the New
York and Erie Railroad Company. In 1836 the legislature authorized
the issuance of $3,000,000 of state stock to the company,47 and em-
powered the company to sell the stock at public auction.4 The statute
provided further that the stock was backed by "the faith and credit of
the people of this state. ' 49 However, it was believed that the state would
not be required to redeem the stock or pay interest on it since the rail-
road promised to pay such amounts.50
The statute also granted the state a first mortgage lien and the
right to foreclose in the case of a default of either interest or principal.51
When the railroad became insolvent, however, it was determined that
the state's security was practically worthless. The state's lien covered
the track and roadbed but not the rolling stock, stations, or yards, which
could be freely disposed of by the railroad. Further, the narrow strip
of land involved had real value only as part of an operating railroad.52
The point was proven when, in 1841, the state sold two railroads-secu-
rity for $515,000 of debt-for $16,100. 53
The state was perfectly free to repudiate its debt 54 but attempted
instead to extricate itself. In 1842 the legislature enacted what was
popularly known as the "Stop and Tax" bill,55 which for the first time
45 Id. at 835. The scheme was supported by foreign creditors of the states who
desired to exchange their state debtor for a federal debtor. Id. at 337.
46 Id. at 339.
47 Act of April 23, 1836, ch. 170, § 1, [1836] N.Y. Laws 227.
48 Id. § 7, [1836] N.Y. Laws 229. For a general discussion of state aid to railroads, see
A. HrILHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BoNDs 143-99 (1936).
49 Act of April 23, 1836, ch. 170, § 4, [1836] N.Y. Laws 228.
50 This was supported by the statute:
The said company shall make provision for the punctual redemption of the said
stock, and for the punctual payment of the interest which shall accrue thereon,
in such manner as to exonerate the treasury of this state from any advances of
money for that purpose ....
Id. § 9, [1836] N.Y. Laws 229.
51 Id. § 11.
52 TAXATIO & FINANcE 110.
53 Id.; D. SowERS, supra note 42, at 84.
54 The sovereign power of repudiation was not surrendered in New York until 1920.
N.Y. CONSr. art. VII, § 11 (1920).
55 Act of March 29, 1842, ch. 114, [1842] N.Y. Laws 79.
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since 1827 imposed direct real and personal property taxes. 56 The Act
further provided that expenditures for all public works, with certain
exceptions, be suspended. 57
In 1841 Arphaxad Loomis proposed a basic reform intended to
prevent a recurrence of the state's problems.58 Loomis's bill, known
as the "People's Resolution," sought to restrain the previously un-
limited legislative power to create debt by requiring that debt could
not be incurred without a referendum of the people.59 In 1842 the
Loomis bill was defeated by a tie vote in the Assembly.6" In 1844, how-
ever, the legislature proposed a constitutional amendment incorporating
the People's Resolution.6 Passage by the succeeding legislature and sub-
mission to the people would have been required for its enactment.62
Since a constitutional convention was called in 1845, the People's Res-
olution was never submitted separately to the people, but it was rati-
fied as part of the 1846 constitution.
On November 4, 1845, the people voted favorably on a proposition
calling for a convention to consider and alter the constitution.6 3 The
Convention assembled in Albany on June 1, 1846, and adjourned
October 9 of the same year.64 The Convention's Address to the People,
submitted with the proposed new constitution, stated that the Conven-
tion had "placed strong safeguards against the recurrence of debt, and
the improvident expenditure of the public money." 65 The constitution
56 Id. § 1; 2 LINCOLN 84.
57 The law stated: "All further expenditure on the the public works now in the
progress of construction, shall be suspended until the further order of the legisla-
ture ...." Act of March 29, 1842, ch. 114, § 10, [1842] N.Y. Laws 83.
58 2 LINCOLN 82; TAxATION & FINANCE 86-87.
59 2 LINCOLN 82; TAXATION & FINANCE 86-87.
60 2 LINCOLN 83; TAXATION & FINANCE 87.
61 Con. Res. of April 15, 1844, [1844] N.Y. Laws 538.
62 N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1821).
63 The vote on the proposition was 213,257 to 33,860. MANUAL FOR THE USE OF THE
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 316 (Secretary of State ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE MANUAL]. The call for a convention was believed by some to be
unconstitutional. J. DOUGHERTY, .supra note 2, at 159 n.13. Presumably the theory was
that the 1821 constitution provided a procedure for amendment but not for the calling
of a new convention. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1821). The 1846 constitution settled this
question for the future by expressly providing for a call every 20 years and at such other
times as the legislature might provide. N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (1846). The 20-year
call provision is also a recognition that the constitution was moving from a general
document granting broad powers to one more statutory in nature. Consequently, the
question of revision should be submitted to the people at fairly frequent intervals.
64 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEw YomK, 1846, at 17, 1082 (W. Attree & W.
Bishop eds. 1846) [hereinafter cited as 1846 DEBATEs].
65 2 LINCOLN 215-16.
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was ratified by the people by a vote of 221,528 to 92,436.66 The two
major contributions of the Convention-which have survived more
or less intact-concerned (1) the Finance Committee's work on state
debt and appropriations and (2) the regulation of corporations.
A. The Work of the Finance Committee
On July 30, 1846, Michael Hoffman, Chairman of the Finance
Committee, reported to the Convention on a proposed new article to
restrain the creation of future state debt.67 Mr. Hoffman believed
"that upon this article the committee were in the main . . . unani-
mous. s68 On September 22 the proposed article came before the Con-
vention for debate.69
The article contained three main provisions. Section 1 provided
that "no money shall ever be paid out of the treasury ... except in
pursuance of an appropriation by law" nor unless payment be made
within two years of the passage of the act.70 Further, such an appropria-
tion "shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated, and the object to
which it is to be applied."71 Section 2 provided that the "credit of the
state shall not, in any manner, be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any
individual, association or incorporation." 72 Section 5 provided that
the state could contract no debt except by a law approved by a referen-
dum.7 3 Two exceptions were created to this third rule: the legislature
could contract debt (1) to "repel invasion" or "suppress insurrection" 74
or (2) in the amount of $1,000,000 to meet casual expenses. 75 At the
68 LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 316.
67 1846 DEBATES 462. The language of the proposed article was clear and concise.
This was no doubt the result of Hoffman's general philosophy, which he expressed early
in the Convention: "But there is no law over the Legislature but the Constitution it-
self, and limitations that were not set forth in clear and definite terms, and in a strong
and direct manner, would scarcely be observed by the Legislature." Id. at 57-58.
68 Id. at 463.
69 Id. at 940.
70 Id. at 462.
71 Id. The existing practice was apparently somewhat loose. Hoffman observed that
"if the executive had but a corporal's guard to drive off the legislature, the government
could go on for 50 years without it." Id. at 941.
72 Id. at 462.
73 Id.
74 Id. The Attorney General was later to rule that the state could not borrow under
this exception clause for purposes of the Civil War. The Attorney General apparently
reasoned that the state had not been invaded and that the United States, not the state
of New York, was at war. III PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK HELD IN 1867 AND 1868, at 1850-51 (E. Underhill ed. 1868)
[hereinafter cited as 1867-68 DEBATES].
75 1846 DEBATEs 462.
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same time, further restrictions were placed upon debt that required
referendum approval. This debt had to be for some "single work or
object to be distinctly specified," 76 and the law proposing it had to
impose a direct annual tax sufficient to pay annual interest and to
retire the debt within eighteen years. 77 Such a law could only be sub-
mitted at a general election when no other law or constitutional amend-
ment was to be voted upon by the people r.7
The requirement of specific appropriations and a two-year
limitation on such appropriations was adopted by the Convention after
little discussion.79 Even less discussion was had on section 2, the im-
portant provision prohibiting the gift or loan of state credit, which was
adopted unanimously.8 0 Section 3, which permitted debt not in excess
76 Id.
77 Id. The requirement of redemption within 18 years apparently was designed to
avoid casting the burden of payment upon future generations. Id. at 943-44.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 940-43.
80 Lincoln explains this lack of discussion by noting that the members were all
thoroughly familiar with the problem and of one mind as to its solution. 2 LINCOLN
179-80. This, in its entirety, is the Convention's deliberation of the gift and loan pro-
vision:
The second section was then read, as follows:
§ 2. The credit of the state shall not, in any manner, be given or loaned to,
or in aid of, any individual, association or incorporation.
Some conversation here ensued between Messrs. VAN SCHOONHOVEN and RICH-
MOND, in relation to the matter before at issue between them.
Mr. SWACKHAMER moved to add after the word "credit" the words "money or
property."
Mr. HoFFMAN hoped this motion would not be persisted in. If the state had
money to loan or property to sell, it had better be allowed to do it. He was ready
to guard against mischief which had become apparent, and he was satisfied that
the words were broad enough.
Mr. SWACKEAMER had no desire to persist in his amendment, and would with-
draw it.
Mr. O'CoNoR moved to add to the end of the section the following:
"Nor shall any gift of public moneys or property be made except as a reward
for military services, or by the release of escheats or forfeitures.["]
Mr. RussLL thought the words of the section were sufficiently guarded, and
he hoped therefore that this amendment would not be adopted.
Mr. O'CoNoR then withdrew his amendment, if there was any objection to it.
The second section was then adopted unanimously.
1846 DEBATEs 943.
It should be noted that by amendment adopted in 1874, Mr. Swackhamer's prohibition
of the gift or loan of state money became part of the constitution. N.Y. CONsr. art. VIII,
§ 10 (1874).
Henry C. Adams wrote in 1887 of various constitutional attempts to restrict public
debt as follows:
Perhaps the most effective method of providing against the evils of public in-
debtedness, when considered in connection with the history of railroad develop-
ment in this country, is found in the almost universal provision against lending
either State or local credit to private corporations.
AnAms 381.
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of $1,000,000, and section 4, which permitted debt to repel invasions,
were both unanimously adopted by the Convention without discus-
sion.81
Section 5 provided that, except as specified in sections 3 and 4, the
state could not contract debt without -a vote of the people. Finally,
the Committee proposal ran into substantial opposition. About a third
of the Convention opposed the referendum requirement; 82 another
third thought the referendum requirement too liberal and that debt
should be prohibited except as provided in sections 3 and 4.83 The
Committee was in the middle. Hoffman, in view of the expected con-
troversy, explained the purpose of the provision at some length:
If we look at home, at the neighboring states, or to foreign rep-
resentative governments, we shall be obliged to acknowledge that
their greatest infirmity is their disposition to contract debts. The
freest government on the other side of the water has contracted
the largest debt known to history .... [I]t behoves those who were
desirous of securing free and republican government to find some
limitation safe in practice to this most dangerous power. In almost
any case if a bad law is passed by the legislature it can be repealed
-the legislature have few temptations to pass a bad one. It is not
so in relation to the subject of debts and compound interest. It is
silent, creeps along, gets into the State, and when the act is once
passed, the debt incurred, the obligation is as strong as death for
its payment. That can only be wrung from the industry of the
people, by taxes, indirect or direct. This being the case, and being
so entirely different from almost all subjects on which legislation
can act, it requires an especial remedy.... They who vote the debt,
vote to tax, although they cast the burden of the tax upon those
who come after them.... [Under the proposed section t]he means
of payment would go with the work, and this . . . would give
reasonable security against unnecessary and improper debt ...
[T]he provision requiring the appropriation bills to be submitted
at a special election [would tend].., to direct the undivided atten-
tion of the people to the subject.84
As Hoffman concluded, objections came from the right and the
left. Mr. Worden stated that the referendum requirement "was subver-
sive of every principle of a representative government"; 85 its adoption
81 1846 DEBATES 943.
82 Id. at 950.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 943-44. The provision requiring a tax sufficient to pay the debt service
Hoffman thought essential since, "in the future like the past, it will be alleged that the
work will be abundantly productive of revenue, and the legislature might be induced to
believe it, and thus incur the debt." Id. at 944. The state's sad experience with respect
to the railroads' promises was dear in Hoffman's mind.
85 Id. at 947.
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would "be saying to the world in so many words, that republican
government had proved a failure."88s Mr. Bascom agreed, noting that
the proposed section would "change our representative government into
a democracy."8 Similarly, Mr. Simmons expressed his view that "it
was going back to the old form of personal government as practiced
by the Athenians and Romans."88 Mr. Worden further noted that a
referendum requirement would relieve the legislature of responsibility
for the creation of debt and would therefore lead to legislative log-
rolling.8 9
In support of the Committee proposal, Mr. Arphaxad Loomis
pointed out that debt was essentially antidemocractic because it
restrained the freedom of future generations without their consent:
"[T]he legislature and the people ... never had the right to legislate
for the future, to enthrall and bind down those who came after them,
either by debt or any other system of legislation which would prevent
them from a perfect freedom of action." 90
Mr. Nicoll observed that "no one reform had been called for more
emphatically or earnestly by the people than that a proper restriction
in the matter of creating debt should be imposed upon the legisla-
ture."91 Mr. Nicoll continued:
86 Id. at 945.
87 Id. at 944. Mr. Bascom took the position that to require a tax for payment of
the debt would sufficiently guard the people's interest without the necessity for a referen-
dum.
88 Id. at 947.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 944-45.
The political tendencies of public debt were outlined by Henry C. Adams as follows:
The funding system stands opposed to the full realization of self-government...
Any method of procedure, therefore, by which a public servant can veil the
true meaning of his acts, or which allows the government to enter upon any
great enterprise without bringing the fact fairly to the knowledge of the public,
must work against the realization of the constitutional idea....
A loan calls for no immediate payment from the people, but produces
vast sums for the government. It requires a certain degree of thought to recognize
that debts imply burdens, and for this reason a government that resorts to borrow-
ing may for a time avoid just censure. Loans do not, like direct taxes, demand a
visible payment from the people; nor, like indirect taxes, raise the price of con-
sumed articles. They address themselves rather to the interests of those who have
control over capital, and by the promise of a perpetual annuity induce the holders
of money to intrust it to the state. The administration is satisfied, since its
necessities have been relieved without exciting the jealousy of the people; the
lenders are satisfied, since they have secured a good investment for their capital
and are not bothered with its management; while the people are not dis-
satisfied because of their profound ignorance of what has taken place. Herein
lies the danger of permitting a government freely to mortgage its sovereign credit.
ADA s 22-24.
01 1846 DEBATES 947.
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The experience of the past, had demonstrated that to leave to the
legislature the unrestricted power to pledge at their will, to any
extent and for any time, the property of every individual in the
State was productive of the grossest injustice. 92
Nicoll then responded to the argument that a referendum was incon-
sistent with the republican form of government. Nicoll did not desire
to become involved in a philosophical discussion; he noted simply that
"[i]t might be so" but that the people would consider it an improvement
in the "science of government." 3
In the course of the debates, Hoffman gave the most concise state-
ment of the Committee proposal:
[I]t was saying that we will not trust the legislature with the power
of creating indefinite mortgages on the people's property.
-.. And... that whenever the people were to have their prop-
erty mortgaged for a State debt, that it should be done by their own
voice, and by their own consent.94
Mr. Worden proposed an amendment that would have deleted
the referendum requirement; it was defeated by a vote of seventy to
thirty-four. 5 Another amendment was proposed by those who believed
the Committee version too liberal. Mr. Shepard, expressing the more
restrictive view, observed that to his mind the question was "[w]hether
the government should hereafter be confined to the simple purposes
of the administration of the laws and the framing of them, or whether
it should be left at liberty to run wild as heretofore .. . ."6 He then
moved to amend the section to prohibit debt except in case of invasion
or up to $1,000,000 for casual expenses.97
Hoffman's response to Shepard's "too strict" view was that it was
unrealistic and that its inflexibility would lead to a situation where
"the legislature would in a few years get back the debt contracting
92 Id. at 948.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 946.
95 Id. at 950.
906 Id. at 944. Mr. Patterson spoke in a similar vein:
Mr. PATTERSON was decidedly opposed to incurring a single dollar more of
debt. He felt but little interest in these amendments; after we had adopted a
provision authorizing the Legislature to create debts in case of war or invasion,
then he did not believe there would ever be any necessity to incur any other
debt to the amount of a single dollar. [Cries of "Good-that's the true doctrine.']
He should, therefore, certainly vote for the amendment of Mr. SssreARD.
Id. at 945.
97 Id. at 944.
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power, in fall force, without any restrictions."98 The Convention voted
the Shepard amendment down by a vote of seventy-three to thirty-
one.99 The Convention then adopted the Committee proposal by a
vote of seventy-two to thirty-six.100
B. The Regulation of Corporations
Public feelings with respect to corporations had played a prom-
inent part in calling the ,1846 Convention. 101 On July 2, Arphaxad
Loomis, as Chairman of the Committee on Incorporations Other than
Municipal and Banking, submitted to the Convention his committee's
version of a new corporation article.10 2 The Committee proposal would
have prohibited the creation of any corporation'0 3 except by general
law.- 0  Further, the Committee required that all corporations be sub-
ject to such laws as "the legislature may from time to time enact." As
a result, the power to repeal or modify could not be surrendered or
contracted away by the legislature.
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,10 5 Justice Story
said that if a legislature intends to retain the power to alter or revoke
rights vested in a corporate charter, "it must be reserved in the grant."'10 6
98 Id. at 946.
99 Id. at 950
100 Id.
101 Arphaxad Loomis, addressing the 1846 Convention, noted:
The people had seen a system existing by which the government had granted
to particular individuals special privileges which had been refused to others,
contrary to the great principle of equality among men.
Id. at 222.
102 Id. at 221. Section one of the Committee-proposed article provided:
Sec. 1. Special laws, creating incorporations or associations, or granting to them
exclusive privileges, shall not be passed. But the legislature may pass general
laws by which any person may become incorporated on complying with the pro-
visions to be contained in such laws. And all corporations shall be subject to
all such general laws as the legislature may from time to time enact not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this constitution.
Id.
103 Loomis, on the Convention floor, offered an amendment to exclude from the
general prohibition corporations formed for municipal purposes. Id. at 968. This exception
is found in Article X, § 1, of the present constitution.
104 Note 102 supra.
105 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
106 Id. at 712 (concurring opinion).
In Dartmouth College, Chief Justice Marshall, although finding the college to be
a private institution, noted that if the corporate charter "be a grant of political power,
if it create a civil institution to be employed in the administration of the government,"
then the legislature may act "unrestrained by any limitation" in the Constitution. Id. at
629-30. What are known in New York as authorities or public corporations all appear to
be governmental within the meaning of Marshall's distinction. The Housing Finance
Agency statute is typical. It provides that the Agency "shall be a corporate governmental
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In Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,10 7 Justice Taney qualified
Dartmouth College and ruled that exemption from the power to repeal
need not be reserved; that surrender of a sovereign power will not be
found unless stated in unmistakable terms. In New York there was
to be no question about the matter; the constitution would require
that all corporate charters remain subject to the legislative power. If
the legislature sought to enact an irrepealable law, it would be beyond
its power.
A fair number of delegates were not concerned with the question
of irrepealability; they objected to the idea of corporations in any form.
During the debate on the corporations article, Mr. Swackhamer is
reported as stating:
You talk of the prosperity of the country, and refer to your wealthy
citizens and magnificent edifices as an evidence of it .... [T]his
[is not] a safe criterion by which to judge.... The time was in this
country when mechanics could reserve something from their weekly
earnings for future events, but it [is] not so now-and why? ...
[l]t [is] because we ha[ve] departed from the true principles of
government, in creating artificial bodies and interfering with the
private business of life.108
In a similar vein, Mr. Morris was reported during the debate as
stating that he
was in the very broadest practical acceptation of the word anti-
corporation. He believed that the legislature should be restricted
from granting a corporation [power] to perform any of the ordinary
business of life now transacted by individuals or voluntary associa-
tions. His honest convictions were that corporations were an
evil .... 109
Loomis did not agree with these views, stating that the "necessity"
agency." N.Y. Paxv. Hous. FIN. LAw § 43(l) (McKinney 1962). The recently enacted
Urban Development Corporation Act goes even further and provides that it is "a
corporate governmental agency of the state, constituting a political subdivision." N.Y.
UNCONSOL LAws § 6254(1) (McKinney Supp. 1970). Both acts confer tax exemption on
the ground that the exercise of the powers granted will constitute the performance of
"an essential governmental function." N.Y. PRav. Hous. FIN. LAw § 54 (McKinney 1962);
N.Y. UNCONSOL LAws § 6272 (McKinney Supp. 1970). Similarly, tax exemption is granted
to the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority because of its performance of "an es-
sential governmental function." N.Y. PuB. Aur. LAw §§ 566, 566-a (McKinney 1970). It is
therefore apparent, according to Dartmouth College, that such authority charters may be
freely altered or repealed by the legislature "unrestrained by any limitation" in the
Federal Constitution.
107 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
108 1846 D-ArzTs 972.
109 Id. at 973.
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for corporations had been shown.110 The question as he saw it was "how
they should be regulated so as to produce all necessary good and prevent
unjust inequalities."'1 1 Central to the idea of any regulation of corpora-
tions was the prohibition of an irrepealable law. As Delegate Jordan
stated:
The question is, shall the legislature grant exclusive privileges or
monopolies? Shall they have power of granting the franchise of
banking or taking toll, or the like, to one, and not to another; or
to grant it to one in exclusion of another? All that the section con-
templated was that the legislature never should grant the right of
doing a particular thing ... and at the same time stipulate with
the granter that he should be entitled to that right exclusively,
and that they could grant it to no one else.' 12
The Charles River Bridge case seemed prominent in the delegates'
minds. Mr. Simmons queried Mr. Jordan, in the case of a bridge com-
pany formed to construct a bridge across the Hudson River at Albany,
should not the legislature have the power "to make the privilege worth
something, by making it exclusive, and to say that no other bridge
should be built within a certain distance of it?"113 Mr. Jordan replied
that the legislature could be trusted not to destroy the benefits of a
previously granted franchise that had induced large investment and
served the public honestly. But there could be no question that the
110 Id. at 962. Loomis, however, was not free of anticorporation feeling. He ex-
pressed something of this idea when he observed:
An incorporation is a person-a legal person, and not a natural one. It is impelled
on to action by the same motives of gain which impel private citizens, but it is
not restrained by the same motive of benevolence and of humanity, and of
fellow feeling, which exists in the mind of every individual person, and which
restrain his selfish propensities in the acquisition of gain.
Id. at 222.
Similarly, the Committee's original proposal included two other interesting pro-
visions: § 3 would have established proportionate shareholder liability for the obligations
of an insolvent corporation (id. at 221), and § 2 would have prohibited a corporation
from incurring debt in an amount greater than (1) its capital stock actually paid in and
(2) its undistributed net profits (id.). Section 2 was rejected by the Convention on the
ground that it was statutory in nature (id. at 974), while § 3 narrowly passed after ex-
tensive debate (id. at 974-79). As a result of a later impasse in the debates, the entire
corporation article was submitted to a select committee for recommendations. Id. at
1006. The select committee's draft deleted § 3's shareholder liability provision. Id. at
1013. Thereafter, a proposal by a minority of the select committee to impose share-
holder liability in an amount equal to the face value of stock held was narrowly re-
jected by the Convention by a vote of 51 to 42. Id. at 1013, 1021.
111 Id. at 962.
112 Id. at 967.
113 Id.
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legislature had the power.-"the inalienable Constitutional power of
doing so."'1 4
Apparently, at the time of the Convention, there were considered
to be two categories of corporations in the state, those under control
of the legislature and those not. In recognition of this, Jordan sought
to modify the language of the proposed article "so as to make future
laws applicable to future corporations, because there were some cor-
porations now existing which were not under the control of the legis-
lature."-" ' Jordan elaborated on this point by saying that he "desired to
guard against any infringement of what he considered to be the plighted
faith of the state, with reference to corporations already existing."'" 8
In sum, Jordan seemed to agree with the Charles River Bridge case that
a charter could be irrepealable if it expressly purported to be.
Mr. Samuel J. Tilden, later Governor of the state, apparently
disagreed with this view of existing law. His reply to Jordan took the
inalienability approach that there could be no such thing as an irrepeal-
able law. Tilden's statement is reported as follows: "He held that the
legislature could grant no corporate power or privilege which it had
not the right to revoke."'1 7
As adopted by the Convention, the constitution took the Jordan
view and did not apply to preexisting corporations. 18 Regardless of
whether the Tilden or Jordan view of the prior law was correct, there
could be no question as to the future. The constitution henceforth
114 Mr. Jordan stated:
As a general rule monopolies are odious in this and all other countries. It did
not follow that the legislature must, or would, although they had the power,
the inalienable Constitutional power of doing so, grant a franchise to the destruc-
tion of the benefits of one previously granted, when under the power large in-
vestments, conducing to public convenience had been made in good faith, and
when it was fairly and honestly exercised. He thought it would be quite safe
to leave that to the legislature.
Ad.
It will no doubt strike the reader as curious that, in 1937, the legislature amended
the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority Act to provide that
the state of New York does covenant and agree with the holders of any bonds
that no tunnel, bridge ... or other connection for vehicular traffic, which will be
competitive with either project hereby authorized [Triborough Bridge and White-
stone Bridge] will be constructed or maintained.
Act of Jan. 28, 1937, ch. 3, § 12, [1937] N.Y. Laws 9.
115 1846 DEBATES 973.
116 Id. at 974.
117 Id.
118 N.Y. CONsT. art. VIII (1846). Dougherty, in his constitutional history, describes
the Convention's deliberations as follows: "As the Dartmouth College decision had placed
corporate charters theretofore granted above revocation, the constitution wisely reserved
to the legislature the power of altering or repealing all such charters as should there-
after be granted." J. DOUGMMTY, supra note 2, at 168.
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provided: "All general laws and special acts passed pursuant to this
section, may be altered from time to time or repealed.""19
III
THE 1874 AMENDMENTS
At the 1846 Convention Mr. Swackhamer had sought to broaden
the prohibition of the gift or loan of state credit by prohibiting the
gift or loan of state property or money.120 Mr. Hoffman resisted the
amendment, remarking that he "was ready to guard against mischief
which had become apparent.' 2' New mischief quickly became appar-
ent.
In 1851 the legislature enacted a law directing the Comptroller to
issue $9,000,000 of "canal revehue certificates" for the purposes of
enlarging the Erie Canal and completing the Genesee Valley and Black
River Canals. 122 The "certificates" were to pay interest at a rate not
in excess of six percent and were to be redeemed within twenty-one
years. 123 In addition, they were payable only out of a special fund of
future surplus canal revenues. 24 The statute expressly disclaimed any
state liability with respect to the certificates.125 No referendum was held.
119 The Committee position on irrepealability seemed to be fairly easily accepted
by the Convention. Technical objections were directed at other aspects of the Commit-
tee proposal. For example, the Committee's absolute requirement of creation pursuant
to general law was considered too rigid. 1846 DEBATES 970. The proposal was therefore
modified to provide for creation by special act if the legislature determined that the
objects of the corporation could not be attained under general laws. N.Y. CoNsT. art.
VIII, § 1 (1846).
Subsequent to the initial adoption of the article on September 25, it was recon-
sidered and further debate ensued. 1846 DEBATES 981-84. On September 29, Samuel Tilden,
to restore some order to the situation, moved that the article be referred to a select
committee with instructions to report the next day. Id. at 1005-06; see note 110 supra.
The following day Tilden reported for the select committee. 1846 DEBATES 1013. The
committee revised the earlier language and inserted the language now found in the con-
stitution: "All general laws and special acts passed pursuant to this section, may be
altered from time to time or repealed." Id. This provision was adopted by the Conven-
tion. Id. at 1020.
120 1846 DEBATES 943; see note 80 supra.
121 1846 DEBATES 943. Hoffman had also said that "limitations that were not set
forth in dear and definite terms, and in a strong and direct manner, would scarcely be
observed by the Legislature." Id. at 58.
122 Act of July 10, 1851, ch. 485, [1851] N.Y. Laws 911.
123 Id. § 2, [1851] N.Y. Laws 912.
124 Id. § 1, [1851] N.Y. Laws 911.
125 The statute provided that "the state shall in no event be liable to make up any
deficiency of revenue, or to redeem the canal revenue certificates .... " Id. § 14, [1851]
N.Y. Laws 916. It further provided that the certificates shall not be "construed as to
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Within five years of the 1846 constitution, then, the state was
issuing what looked like debt without a referendum,'126 the draftsmen's
apparent theory being that this was permissible if the certificates were
payable out of a special fund and. the state's liability expressly dis-
claimed. Samuel Tilden, in April of 1851, wrote to the Albany Atlas
attacking the proposed act.127 Tilden observed that he owed it to the
memory of his friend Michael Hoffman to show that Hoffman's work
was not so imperfectly done as to permit such obvious evasion.128
The validity of the statute was attacked in two lower court cases.
In People v. Newell,'129 the validity of the act was upheld without
discussion. In Rodman v. Munson,130 the act was held inoperative and
void as repugnant to the constitution. It was argued there that the act
did not create a debt but was to be viewed as a sale, mortgage, or trust
involving future canal revenues. In the alternative, it was maintained
that the constitutional provisions only applied to debts which might
require resort to taxation; that the constitution did not intend to
prohibit debts "which would certainly and eventually pay for them-
selves."''1 1 Justice Strong rejected these arguments, observing that prom-
ises that an asset would be self-supporting had led to many of the
pre-1846 abuses:
Indeed, the most extravagant works in the state, and some of them
were very extravagant, had been urgently supported, and had been
finally adopted, upon that supposition. The convention had the
sagacity to see that the practice of granting away the public money
upon the annual productiveness of such works was a dangerous
one, and that in fact no human foresight could enable the legis-
lature to determine with certainty that any projected improvement
"would certainly and inevitable [sic] pay for itself." Indeed, there
had been sad mistakes on that subject, for which the state had
severely -suffered. The convention knew that the legislature had too
readily listened to sanguine, loose and interested calculations, and
no doubt designed to avert the danger of incurring heavy debts
under such pretenses. 3 2
create any debt or liability against the state, or the people thereof,. within the meaning
of section twelve, article seven of the constitution [prohibiting the creation of debt with-
out a referendum]." Id.
126 By contrast, the 1938 constitution was to be treated deferentially; it was over
20 years before the legislature passed an act at obvious variance with it. Housing Finance
Agency Act, ch. 671, [1960] N.Y. Laws 1945.
127 J. DOUGHERTY, supra note 2, at 175.
128 Id.
129 13 Barb. 86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 7 N.Y. 9 (1852).
130 13 Barb. 63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 13 Barb. 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd sub nom.
Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 9 (1852).
181 13 Barb. at 204.
132 Id.
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The justice also pointed out that the Convention sought to protect
the state from the "dishonor of repudiation" and that although in view
of the disclaimer "[i]t might not be exactly repudiation," it would
nonetheless "look very like it" if the state retained the public work
and refused to repay the funds that had constructed it.13 3 The court
went on to hold that in reality the transaction created state debt in
violation of the constitution.
A month later the Court of Appeals affirmed Rodman and re-
versed the lower court decision in Newell.134 Writing for the court,
Chief Judge Ruggles (who had been a delegate to the 1846 Convention)
found a violation of the constitutional provisions requiring that the
canal "remainder" be applied "in each fiscal year" to the Erie enlarge-
ment and the completion of the Genesee Valley and Black River ca-
nals.135 These provisions established a constitutional directive that the
canal work be financed on a "pay as you go" basis as actual surplus
revenues became available. Because, pursuant to the 1851 act, $9,000,000
would be borrowed and the work would be completed within three
years, the Chief Judge found that the constitutional mandate requiring
application of the canal remainders "in each fiscal year" had been
violated. He noted that "[t]he chief object of the restraint imposed by
the [referendum requirement] of the constitution, upon the contracting
of public debt, was to protect the people against the exhausting burthen
of paying interest. '136
The Chief Judge was unimpressed with the argument that the debt
was not debt within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition
since it was not backed by the general credit of the state but was re-
stricted to a special fund:
133 Id. at 205.
134 Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 9 (1852).
135 N.Y. CoNsr. art. VII, § 3 (1846). The constitution established a series of priorities
for the application of the canal revenues. After paying expenses and ordinary repairs,
the revenues were to be applied in each year: (1) towards the payment of the outstand-
ing canal debt at the rate of $1,300,000 annually between 1846 and 1855 and thereafter
at the rate of $1,700,000 annually until the canal debt "shall be wholly paid" (id. § 1);
(2) if any revenue remained, it was to be paid towards the outstanding general fund debt
("including the debt for loans of the State credit to railroad companies') at the rate of
$350,000 per year until the canal debt was repaid and thereafter $1,500,000 annually
until the general fund debt was repaid (id. § 2); (3) if any revenue remained, the general
fund of the state was to receive $200,000 to defray necessary expenses (id. § 5); and (4)
"the remainder of the revenues of the said canals shall, in each fiscal year, be applied, in
such manner as the Legislature shall direct, to the completion of the Erie canal enlarge-
ment, and the Genesee Valley and Black River canals, until the said canals shall be
completed" (id.). It was the disposition of these least mentioned "remainders" which was
at issue in the act of 1851 and Newell.
136 7 N.Y. at 86.
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The restraints imposed by the [referendum requirement] are in
effect annulled, if the legislature may borrow without limit upon a
pledge of the public property or the public revenue. The extent
to which this may be carried, if tolerated in the present instance,
renders [that] section of the constitution nugatory and useless.18 7
The Chief Judge was also unpersuaded that the disclaimer pro-
vision changed the tenor of the transaction. He noted that the dis-
claimer section "professing to limit the liability of the state, might
give rise to objection and controversy; but sooner or later the claim
would prevail, and could not be effectually resisted."'138
The dissenting opinion of Judge Welles presented the most clever
and specious argument on behalf of the act: The constitution prohibits
the creation of state debt except in the specified manner (including
submission to a referendum); it is obviously impossible to create state
debt unless the constitution is complied with; since the 1851 act does
not comply with the constitution, it cannot create a state debt. As
Judge Welles put it: "Where is the burthen created or debt contracted
by the act, which the constitution has not authorized and directed?
None whatever has been, or can be shown."'18 9
137 Id. at 87.
138 Id. at 93. Some 75 years later a disclaimer provision gave rise to "objection and
controversy" and, as Ruggles had predicted, the claim prevailed despite the disclaimer.
Williamsburgh Say. Bank v. State, 243 N.Y. 231, 153 N.E. 58 (1926). The court in Williams-
burgh apparently did not have the benefit of the Newell decision; it was not argued
by the parties and is not cited by the court.
'39 7 N.Y. at 130.
Ruggles apparently had no patience with this argument and makes no mention
of it in his opinion. Judge Johnson, in his concurring opinion, seemed to have it in mind
in his discussion of the disclaimer provision:
It does not alter, or profess to alter, any one provision of the act. It leaves them
all standing on the statute book, with the apparent force of law, and with the
sanction of legislative approval, forming together a single scheme for raising
money, on the faith of which capital is invited to assist the state. Under this
state of things, can we be asked to take the ground that the state is to be regarded
as coming into the money market, with a cunningly devised plan of promises,
seemingly efficacious, but really known to be wholly unlawful and incapable of
conferring any legal right, and by such means seeking to procure the advance of
money? The respect which we owe to the legislature forbids us to listen for one
moment to the suggestion.
Id. at 106.
A recent example of a "cunningly devised plan of promises, seemingly efficacious,
but really known to be wholly unlawful" is found in the Housing Finance Agency
statute (N.Y. Pan,. Hous. FIN. LAw §§ 40-59 (McKinney 1962)) and those modeled after
it. In the event of a deficiency in the debt service reserve fund, that statute provides
that any needed amount "shall be apportioned and paid [by the state] to the agency
during the then current state fiscal year." Id. § 47(5)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1970). This
provision constitutes nothing but a state guarantee, unequivocal on its face, of Housing
Finance Agency bonds. Since no referendum was held, the provision is unconstitutional.
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Until 1846 there was no constitutional provision dealing with
restrictions on the power of cities to incur debt. 140 No city was given
this power in its charter; consequently a special authorization from the
legislature was required for each city debt issue. 141 The 1846 constitu-
tion did not expressly limit the powers of cities to contract debt. Instead,
it directed the legislature to restrict a city's power to borrow money
or loan its credit "so as to prevent abuses in assessments, and in con-
tracting debt by such municipal corporations.' 42 Since the legislature
already had full power with respect to this, and since the constitution
did not specify any course of conduct, the constitutional provision seems
to amount to a general admonition. 14
As the national government had pushed the burden of financing
improvements on to the state, the state now felt constrained to push the
burden on to local government. Beginning in 1851 the legislature passed
a series of acts, known as the town bonding acts, that authorized cities
to borrow money to invest in railroad company stock. The earlier acts
permitted the city to borrow for such purpose; the later acts compelled
the borrowing. A typical statute authorized the city of Rochester to
borrow $300,000 on its "faith and credit" at an interest rate not to
exceed seven percent for a term of no more than twenty years. 144 The
proceeds of the bond issue "shall be invested in the stock of the Roch-
ester and Genesee Valley railroad company."'145 The dividends on the
railroad stock, if any, were to be applied to the interest on the city
bonds; if the dividends were insufficient to meet interest due, the city
was authorized to impose a tax.14 The act provided that it "shall not
take effect" until approved by the voters at a special election. 147
It may be argued, as was done in Newell, that the provision cannot create a debt be-
cause the constitution requires a referendum and appropriation. If made, this argument
should be disposed of as indicated by Judge Johnson.
140 N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMm., REPORT: NEW YORK CITY GOVERN-
-4ENT FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS 27 (1938).
141 TAXATION & FINANCE 288. See also N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMn.,
REPORT: STATE AN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NEW YORK 543 (1938).
142 N.Y. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 9 (1846).
143 This gentle measure is an indication that abuses at the municipal level were not
the subject of serious concern at the time. That the admonition was ignored by the
legislature is demonstrated by the 1873 bond issue of the town of Morrisania. In that year
the town issued 7% bonds to mature in 1980. Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improve-
ments as Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations, 37 COLUm. L. REv. 177, 180 n.12
(1937). Over the life of the bonds, the town would pay interest amounting to almost 20
times the principal borrowed. Id.
144 Act of July 3, 1851, ch. 389, § 285, [1851] N.Y. Laws 767.
145 Id. § 286.
146 Id. § 287, [1851] N.Y. Laws 768.
147 Id. § 291, [1851] N.Y. Laws 769. This provision led to an interesting question.
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It was perfectly clear under the 1846 constitution that the state itself
could not undertake the commitment outlined in the Rochester stat-
ute.148 Could it, then, authorize one of its lesser instrumentalities to
do so?149 The Court of Appeals held that it could in a series of cases
beginning with Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome.150 In Bank of Rome,
the Court of Appeals noted that nothing in the constitution expressly
limited the legislature's power with respect to municipalities. Rather,
Article VIII, section 9, the admonition provision discussed above, was
read as a constitutional recognition of unlimited legislative power on
the subject. Section 9 directed the legislature to restrict the cities'
power to borrow money and loan their credit so as to prevent abuses.
The court observed that this provision was "ill-suited" to be "judicially
applied" and consequently the legislature's "judgment is not to be
reviewed and reversed in a court of law."'15
The constitution vests the legislative power in the legislature. The legislature cannot
delegate this power to the people. In view of the referendum provision did the legislature
enact the law or did the people? In Barto v. Himrod, 8 N.Y. 483 (1853), the 1849 Free
School Act, ch. 140, [1849] N.Y. Laws 193, was held unconstitutional on the ground that it
was not enacted by the legislature. That law provided for a popular vote on the question
"whether this act shall or not become a law." Id. § 10. Chief Judge Ruggles observed that
the legislative power, with one exception, was vested by the constitution in the Senate
and Assembly. The one exception was the referendum requirement for the issuance of
state debt. The Chief Judge noted that "[t]he people reserved no part of [the legislative
power] to themselves excepting in regard to laws creating public debt; and can therefore
exercise it in no other case." 8 N.Y. at 489. A lower court had upheld the Free School
Act on the ground that it was a conditional statute, made to take effect upon a future
contingent event. Ruggles did not dispute that a law may be passed to take effect upon
the occurrence of a condition, but it "must be law in praesenti to take effect in futuro."
Id. at 490. This was not true of the 1849 law. Further, and more importantly, a popular
vote is not a permissible future condition since its effect would be to delegate a non-
delegable duty. Five years later, in the first town bonding case (Bank of Rome v. Village
of Rome, 18 N.Y. 38 (1858)), the court distinguished Barto on grounds that are not
persuasive. (The statute involved was similar to the Rochester act, calling for a popular
vote by the citizens of Rome to approve the bond issue and purchase of railroad stock.)
The court stated that Barto involved a general law while this "was one of local interest
only." Id. at 45. The court concluded that the act was a valid conditional statute. But the
court did not meet Ruggles's second point; i.e., that a popular vote cannot be a permis-
sible future condition. Clearly, the Barto reasoning is as applicable to a local popular
vote as it is to a state-wide vote. Chief Judge Ruggles, who was a delegate to the 1846
Convention, had retired three years prior to the Bank of Rome case.
148 The prohibition of the gift or loan of state credit to, or in aid of, a corporation
would necessarily prohibit the state from borrowing to purchase railroad stock. N.Y.
CONsr. art. VII, § 9 (1846).
149 Adams, in his work on public debts, made the point as follows: "What right has
a legislature to authorize a township or a city to do that which by public law it is itself
prohibited from doing?" ADAMs 356.
180 18 N.Y. 38 (1858).
151 Id. at 42.
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In the absence of an express limitation in the constitution, were
there any implied limitations? In Bank of Rome, the court thought
there might be implied the idea "that the powers conferred on a mu-
nicipal corporation must relate to the public interests"; that is, there
must be a public purpose.152 The court then found that financing a
railroad involved a public purpose.' 3  The court did note that the
railroad legislation "may be injudicious, and even worse than that,"
but concluded that recourse must be had to the legislature rather than
the courts.154
Within fifteen years the Court of Appeals was to regret the Bank
of Rome decision. Before receding, however, this precedent was fol-
152 Id. at 43.
163 The court noted that it could not conclude "that the power to subscribe for
stock in this railroad was entirely foreign to and unconnected with the public interests
of the village of Rome." Id. at 44. The court did not discuss the theory that the legislature
cannot delegate that which it is prohibited from doing. The theory was well expressed
in an 1856 lower court decision by Justice Allen. Clark v. Rochester, 13 How. Pr. 204 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1856), rev'd, 24 Barb. 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857), aff'd, 28 N.Y. 605 (1864). Justice
Allen noted that all municipal powers are derived from the legislature:
The sovereign power by which the corporation is created, may repeal, alter, or
modify the charter. The powers conferred are mere municipal regulations, sub-
ject to the absolute control of the government, with the qualification that the
power delegated to the subordinate legislature cannot exceed that possessed by
the legislature from which the power is immediately derived.
The legislature of the state cannot do that by a local and subordinate legisla-
tive body, deriving all their powers from it, which it could not do directly by its
own proper legislative enactment.
18 How. Pr. at 206. Justice Allen was later elevated to the Court of Appeals and wrote
a concurring opinion in the last of the town bonding cases. Williams v. Town of Duanes-
burgh, 66 N.Y. 129 (1876).
154 18 N.Y. at 44.
Interestingly, the same legislature that authorized the village of Rome to borrow
money and buy railroad stock also enacted a law purporting to restrict the power of
municipalities to borrow money and loan their credit. Act of July 21, 1853, ch. 603,
[1853] N.Y. Laws 1135. Essentially, the act imposed on the municipalities certain prohibi-
tions that the constitution imposed on the state. The law provided that "[n]o municipal
corporation shall in any manner hereafter loan or give its credit to or in aid of any
individual, association or corporation." Id. § 1. Municipalities were prohibited from
contracting debt except pursuant to a referendum. Id. §§ 2, 5. Furthermore, in no event
could a municipality borrow in excess of eight percent of the value of its assessed real
property. Id. § 3, [1853] N.Y. Laws 1136.
The law expressly provided that it did not "alter, repeal, or modify" any existing
authority that a municipal corporation might have to contract debt. Id. § 6. Would
the act, then, apply to future municipal authorizations? Obviously not, since one legisla-
ture cannot bind another and a later authorization would in every case alter, modify, or
repeal chapter 603. In fact, the Constitutional Commission of 1872 found that local debt
in the state was excessive. See text accompanying notes 180-82 infra. The Act can only
be understood as a public relations effort at a time when the legislature was pursuing a
disastrous policy in aid of the railroads.
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lowed in a series of cases'6 5 and reached a high water mark in an 1874
case, Town of Duanesburgh v. Jenkins.15 6 There it was found that when
a stock subscription had been executed and bonds had been issued by
a town representative, the legislature could compel a town to invest
in railroad stock. 157 In formulating the principle of the case, Commis-
sioner Johnson reasoned as follows:
As the majority in any municipal community has no such inherent
power to bind the minority and require them to bear taxation for
a purpose they disapprove, it is evident that the power thus ex-
ercised is derived from the grant of the legislature. Thus granting
power, the legislature binds the minority without its consent; and,
on the same principle, it may make the duty imperative on both
majority and minority in any locality to subscribe for stock, to
issue bonds, and to pay taxes levied for the purpose of constructing
a railroad.L58
Commissioner Johnson seems logically correct in his extension of
the Bank of Rome precedent. However, almost contemporaneous with
the fullest development of legislative power, that power began to ebb.
In People v. Batchellor,50 a railroad brought a mandamus to compel
the town of Stockton to issue town bonds and invest in railroad stock.
The court below granted the mandamus. The Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that the legislature could not compel a town that had
neither executed a stock subscription nor issued bonds to become a
stockholder in a railroad corporation. The court distinguished Bank
of Rome and the cases following it on the ground that those cases only
held that the legislature could authorize a town to enter into the
transaction.1' 0
155 Starin v. Town of Genoa, 23 N.Y. 439 (1861); Clarke v. Rochester, 28 N.Y. 605
(1864); People v. Mitchell, 35 N.Y. 551 (1866); People v. Smith, 45 N.Y. 772 (1871).
150 57 N.Y. 177 (1874). This decision was made by the Commission of Appeals, a
body having jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals. The Commission
was created by the Judiciary Article of 1869 for a limited period of time in order to
reduce court backlog. N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, §§ 4-5 (1869). This Article was the only part of
the constitution proposed by the 1867 Convention which was ratified by the people.
157 57 N.Y. at 193.
158 Id. at 190.
159 53 N.Y. 128 (1873).
10 As Commissioner Johnson was to indicate in Duanesburgh, decided six months
later, the court's distinction was not strong.
The court did not discuss its earlier holding in People v. Mitchell, 35 N.Y. 551 (1866),
which upheld a mandamus compelling the town of Summit to issue bonds and buy stock
in the Albany and Susquehanna Railroad Company. In that case the court stated:
This authority can be conferred in such a manner, that the objects can be at-
tained either with or without a popular vote ....
It is insisted that, though they were empowered to issue the bonds, they
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The court noted that the legislature could compel a town to issue
bonds for the purpose of constructing a public highway.161 But that
proposition did not control the instant case "unless it shall be further
held that a railroad owned and controlled by a corporation and operated
by it for the benefit of its stockholders is a public highway in the same
sense as the common roads of the country."'62 The court further noted
that it had been uniformly held in eminent domain cases that a taking
of property for a railroad was a taking for a public use.163 But the court
did not find the eminent domain cases controlling in the case of com-
pelling a town "to aid in the construction of a work public in some
respects, but private in others, of at least equal importance."' 64
No doubt the Batchellor decision caused consternation in the finan-
cial community. The court seemed but a short step from overruling
Bank of Rome and thereby impairing some $27,000,000 of local debt.16 5
But the step was never taken. Three years later, the last of the town
bonding cases came to the court in Williams v. Town of Duanes-
burgh.166 By this time the 1874 amendments to the constitution, pro-
were under no legal obligation to exercise the power. From the nature of the
authority, the duty was plainly mandatory ....
Id. at 552, 555-56.
161 This issue had been previously decided by the court in People v. Flagg, 46 N.Y.
400 (1871).
162 53 N.Y. at 139. The Supreme Court of the United States had held that railroads
were indeed public highways in an odd series of cases. See note 176 infra.
163 This line of cases begins with the 1837 decision in Bloodgood v. Mohawk &
H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Ct. Corr. Err. 1837).
164 53 N.Y. at 140.
The rule, as the court saw it, was as follows:
The test is, whether the purpose to be effected is public or private; if the former,
a mandatory statute is valid. If the latter, it is not within the province of legisla-
tion, and consequently not within the power of the legislature, and the act is,
therefore, void. We have seen that a railroad corporation possesses some of the
characteristics of both; public, as to its franchises; private, as to the ownership
of its property and its relations to its stockholders. Were it exclusively public
the act of 1870 would be valid, but void if exclusively private. It follows that,
as the legislature is supreme only as to public purposes, and as the act in question
relates in part to private, that to this extent it is void; and as the latter is in-
separably connected with the former, the entire act must be held void.
Id. at 143.
The Batchellor court noted that a lower court had voided a similar act. In Sweet v.
Hulbert, 51 Barb. 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868), the act held void had authorized the town
of Saratoga to borrow $100,000 and donate the proceeds to a railroad corporation. The
court said that it would be "improper" to question the Bank of Rome precedent,
"although if it were a new question we should hope for a different rule." Id. at 319-20.
But the court noted that the Court of Appeals "has not yet held" that the legislature
may authorize a town to give its money away. The railroad interests did not appeal the
Sweet decision, apparently deciding to leave well enough alone.
165 TAXATION & FiNAxcE 290.
166 66 N.Y.. 129 (1876).
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hibiting the practices that had led to local indebtedness, had been
ratified by the people and were in effect.167 The judgment of the people
on Bank of Rome was therefore dear.
Williams arose in the context of the widespread failure of the
various municipally-funded railroads, and the court reviewed the history
of state railroad policy since Bank of Rome.16 It noted that the town
bonds were purchased "not by capitalists only, but by trustees and per-
sons of limited means."'16 9 That there was to be a large loss was now
evident; the only question was whether it would fall on the community
as a whole or on the bondholders. The court determined that it could
not "without doing the greatest injustice"'170 overrule Bank of Rome.
The court observed:
The doctrine of stare decisis has here a most forcible application.
The rule declared in that case has become in the nature of a rule
of property. It is doubtless true, that in many cases severe taxation
without compensating benefits will be entailed to pay the indebted-
ness created under the bonding acts. But the loss must fall either
upon the community at large, or upon those who have purchased
bonds, the issue of which the legislature sanctioned, and the
validity of which this court deliberately affirmed. 171
167 See text accompanying note 185 infra.
168 Many of these projected lines of road were of doubtful utility, and many
others were in localities where neither population [n]or business warranted the
expectation of a profitable traffic. But it was easy in the abnormal condition of
the country during the civil war to induce individuals or communities to engage
in hazardous enterprises, and to pledge their means or credit to support them.
Legislation to enable cities and towns to pledge their credit in aid of railroads
was readily procured and municipal bonding for railroads became a recognized
part of the system of railroad construction. These bonds were put upon the
market, and were purchased upon the faith of the decision in The Bank of Rome
v. The Village of Rome.
66 N.Y. at 132-33.
169 Id. at 133.
170 Id.
171 Id. The court then distinguished Batchellor on the ground that it only held that a
town could not be compelled to issue bonds and that it did "not understand that case
as deciding that the construction of railroads is not a public purpose for which taxation
may be justified." Id. at 135.
Judge Allen, who as a supreme court justice had held void a town bonding statute
in 1856 (Clark v. Rochester, 13 How. Pr. 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856), rev'd, 24 Barb. 446
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857), aft'd, 28 N.Y. 605 (1864)), concurred in the court's opinion. Judge
Allen disagreed with the court's attempt to distinguish Batchellor:
Mhe cases which affirm the right of the legislature to confer upon municipal
corporations the power referred to were, in effect, overruled. . . . [T]here is no
ground upon which it and the cases which preceded it can be reconciled or made
consistent.
66 N.Y. at 140 (concurring opinion). He then referred to a recent case holding that the
legislature could not authorize a town to issue bonds and invest in the stock of a manu-
facturing corporation. Weismer v. City of Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91 (1876). The 1874 constitu-
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The court's approach seems equivocal. If Bank of Rome was wrong
it should have been overruled; if it was overruled everything pursuant
to it would fall. But this view is unkind to the court for the United
States Supreme Court had already assured the bondholders of payment
even if the Court of Appeals overruled Bank of Rome. In 1853, the
Iowa Supreme Court upheld the issuance of town bonds in exchange
for railroad stock, 72 but in 1859, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed
itself and held such bonds void.7 3 Suit was brought in the federal
courts and the bonds were held valid by the Supreme Court in Gelpcke
v. Dubuque: 74
".. . [I]f the contract, when made, was valid by the laws of the
State as then expounded by all departments of the government, and
administered in its courts of justice, its validity and obligation
cannot be impaired by any subsequent action of legislation, or deci-
sion of its courts .... "
The same principle applies where there is a change of judicial
decision as to the constitutional power of the legislature to enact
the law.175
Presumably, following the Gelpcke decision, all of the Iowa town bonds
tional amendments did not control the Weismer case since the bonds were already
outstanding. The case arose when the town stopped paying interest on the bonds. The
court held that taxes may be laid only for a public purpose and that such purpose must
be "direct and immediate" not "collateral, remote or consequential." Id. at 100. The
operation of a private lumber corporation was held not to be such a public purpose.
172 Dubuque County v. Dubuque & P.R.R., 4 Greene I (Iowa 1853).
173 Stokes v. County of Scott, 10 Iowa 166 (1859).
174 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 175 (1864).
175 Id. at 206, quoting Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416,
432 (1853).
The language in the text, while not entirely dear, indicates that a judicial decision
could so impair a contract as to be in violation of the Constitution. But the contract
clause applies only to laws passed by a state, not judicial decisions. Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249, 260 (1953). The Court further noted that its decision was required by
justice: "We shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a State tribunal
has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice." 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 206-07. Justice Miller,
dissenting, thought the Court's decision brought it into "unseemly conflict" with the
state judiciary (id. at 207); it was saying to the federal courts sitting in Iowa: "When
(the state supreme court] . . . says bonds are void, issued in that State, because they
violate its constitution, you shall say they are valid, because they do not violate the
constitution" (id. at 209) (emphasis in original). Miller further stated that he believed the
Iowa opinion holding the bonds unconstitutional to be "well-reasoned." Id. at 208. Miller
thought existing precedent required that the last decision of the state court be followed.
He saw no reason to vary from the precedent
if a gambling stockbroker of Wall Street buys at twenty-five per cent. of their
par value, the bonds issued to a railroad company in Iowa, although the court
of the State, in several of its most recent decisions, have decided that such bonds
were issued in violation of the [state] Constitution . ...
Id. at 214.
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were negotiated to out-of-state buyers who then successfully brought
suit on them in the federal courts; the Gelpcke decision was followed
in several other Supreme Court cases.
176
176 Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 294 (1866); Thomson v. Lee County,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 827 (1866); Olcott v. Supervisors, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678 (1872). In Olcott,
a case that arose in Wisconsin, the Supreme Court said that "[u]ndoubtedly taxes may not
be laid for a private use." Id. at 694. It then proceeded to find that a railroad was a
public highway. The Wisconsin constitution contained an anti-Dartmouth College pro-
vision similar to that inserted in the New York constitution in 1846. The Court relied
heavily on this reservation of power in finding the railroad to be public. It stated:
That the legislature of Wisconsin may alter or repeal the charter granted to the
Sheboygan and Fond du Lac Railroad Company is certain. This is a power
reserved by the constitution. The railroad can, therefore, be controlled and
regulated by the State.
Id. at 694. It is doubtful that the draftsmen of New York's 1846 constitution intended
the reservation of power to convert a private corporation into a public one.
Sixty years later, the Supreme Court, in Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924),
sought to rationalize the Gelpcke group of cases. In Tidal Oil, two parties claimed oil
lands under deed from the same Creek Indian. Tidal Oil received its deed when the
Indian was a minor. Subsequently, the Indian sought to have the deed set aside but was
defeated in the Oklahoma courts. After reaching his majority, the Indian conveyed the
same property to Flanagan. Flanagan brought suit on his deed and was upheld by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, which also gave recovery for mesne profits. Tidal Oil had
made various contracts and oil and gas leases in reliance on the earlier court decision. It
argued to the United States Supreme Court that the later state court decision violated the
contract clause as interpreted by Gelpcke and also deprived it of property without due
process of law. Chief Justice Taft disagreed with both arguments. He found that there
was no vested right in a court decision and that a change of decision did not deprive a
person of property without due process: "The mere reversal by a state court of its pre-
vious decision, as in this case before us, whatever its effect upon contracts, does not, as
we have seen, violate any clause of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 455.
The Chief Justice also noted that it "has been settled by a long line of decisions,
that the provision of § 10, Article I, of the Federal Constitution, protecting the obliga-
tion of contracts against state action, is directed only against impairment by legislation,
and not by judgment of courts." Id. at 451 (footnote omitted). But the Chief Justice
recognized that there was "persistent error" (id.) with respect to the point and that
Gelpcke, which contained certain "unguarded language" (id. at 454), was the leading
case relied on "to sustain the error" (id. at 451). Taft stated that Gelpcke did not hold
that a later judicial decision could violate the contract clause. Rather, it held that the
Court was free, in diversity cases, to determine state law and that it chose to determine
it in conformity with the earlier state court decision upholding the validity of certain
bonds. The Chief Justice stated:
They were appeals or writs of error to federal courts where recovery was sought
upon municipal or county bonds or some other form of contracts, the validity of
which had been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of a State prior
to their execution, and had been denied by the same court after their issue or
making. In such cases the federal courts exercising jurisdiction between citizens
of different States held themselves free to decide what the state law was, and to
enforce it as laid down by the State Supreme Court before the contracts were
made rather than in later decisions. They did not base this conclusion on Article
I, § 10, of the Federal Constitution ....
Id. at 452.
The Supreme Court, in 1938, held that in diversity cases the federal courts must apply
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Proceeding parallel to the later town bonding cases was a move-
ment for constitutional reform aimed at overruling them. The New
York Constitutional Convention of 1867 debated but did not adopt
such a provision. 177 Perhaps as a result of this failure, the constitution
proposed by the 1867 Convention was defeated by the people.178
In 1872 the legislature created a Constitutional Commission for
the purpose of proposing amendments to the legislature.179 The Com-
mission's Committee on Local Indebtedness determined that local debt,*
in 1872, amounted to $214,300,000.180 This came to almost thirteen
percent of aggregate assessed valuation, 181 and in some towns the debt
amounted to fifty percent of assessed valuation.182 Of the total local
debt, $27,000,000 was attributable to aid for railroads.11 The abuses
to which Bank of Rome had led were now clear.184
the state law as declared by the state courts. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Therefore, if the Taft explanation of Gelpcke is followed, the case can be considered
overruled.
177 II 1867-68 DEBArEs 1137-71; III id. at 1723-26; V id. at 3606-07, 3663-65. The 1867
Convention also debated, but did not adopt, a provision to prohibit the state from giving
or loaning its money in aid of corporations. The purpose of this provision was later ex-
plained by the Court of Appeals as follows:
Cut off from the right to loan or give the credit of the state, however, by
1867 the legislature had begun to resort freely to grants of public funds to rail-
roads and to charitable associations. Therefore, in the constitutional convention
of that year the attempt was renewed to deprive it of that power.
People v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 473, 132 N.E. 241, 243-44 (1921).
Examples of this activity are found in Act of April 3, 1863, ch. 70, [1863] N.Y. Laws 104,
and Act of April 25, 1864, ch. 399, [1864] N.Y. Laws 900, which imposed a state-wide
tax in order to make a gift of money to the Albany and Susquehanna Railroad Company.
Mr. Alvord estimated at the 1867 Constitutional Convention that $750,000 of state monies
had been given to this railroad. II 1867-68 DEBATEs 1143. This provision was debated in
III id. at 1840-48, 2250-59; V id. at 3327-31, 3366-69, 3461-82, 3764-65.
178 2 LINcoLN 419. The 1867 constitution's Judiciary Article, separately submitted,
was ratified by the people. Id.
179 Act of June 15, 1872, ch. 884, [1872] N.Y. Laws 2178. The 32 members of the
Commission were appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Id. § 1. The Commission could recommend amendments to the legislature, and if two
successive legislatures approved the amendments, they could be submitted to the people.
N.Y. CONsr. art. XIII (1846). The debates of the 1872 Constitutional Commission are not
reported.
180 TAXATION & FINANCE 290.
181 Id. at 290, 296.
182 Id. at 290.
188 Id.
184 The Court of Appeals was later to summarize the history of this period as follows:
[N]umerous railroads had been built upon the bonds procured from towns
through which they were constructed in return for stock issued by the corpora-
tions. The inhabitants of the towns were induced to give their consent through
supposed benefits that would result to their property and upon representations
that the earnings of the road would provide dividends upon the stock, with
which they could pay their bonds. In some instances the bonds were procured
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The Constitutional Commission acted clearly and decisively. Any
county, city, town, or village was to be prohibited from: (1) owning
the stock of any corporation; (2) giving or loaning its property or money
to, or in aid of, any individual or corporation; and (3) giving or loaning
its credit to, or in aid of, any individual or corporation. 85 The state
was to be prohibited from giving or loaning "money" to, or in aid of,
any corporation or private undertaking.80 The construction of railroads
had been held to be a public purpose. That, however, was no longer
to be the sole test concerning the disposition of the public credit,
property, or monies. The 1874 amendments were ratified by the people;
the state prohibition by vote of 336,237 to 195,047, and the local pro-
hibition by vote of 337,891 to 194,234.187
In 1884 the constitution was further amended to impose debt limits
upon the larger cities. The provision prohibited the creation of debt
in excess of ten percent of assessed value in cities with a population of
100,000 or more. 88 The Convention and constitution of 1894 kept many
of the provisions discussed above intact; others were changed but not
materially for purposes of this article. 89
and sold and the roads never built. In many other cases the roads in a few years
were sold out under foreclosure of mortgages and the stock cut off. So great was
the evil and so heavy was the burden upon the towns that relief was sought
through a constitutional provision.
Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Mayor, Aldermen & Commonalty, 152 N.Y. 257, 268-69,
46 N.E. 499, 501 (1897).
185 N.Y. CONsr. art. VIII, § 11 (1874). An express exception was created to permit
the aid and support of the poor. Id.
188 Id. § 10. Express exceptions were created for educational purposes and also for
the education and support of the blind, deaf and dumb, and juvenile delinquents. Id.
187 LFGIsLATIVE MANUAL 317.
188 N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (1884). This provision operated as a prohibition against
the acts of the state legislature. Cities and towns were not given the general power to
incur debts until about 1900. TAXATION & FINANCE 298.
189 The constitution proposed by the Convention of 1915 was defeated by the people
by a vote of 400,423 for and 910,462 against. LGIsLATIVE MANUAL 322.
One very unfortunate change took place by amendment in 1918. This was the removal
from the 1846 referendum provision of the requirement that the same law that authorizes
the debt must also impose a tax sufficient to pay it off in 18 years; when the people vote
to authorize a debt they also vote to impose a tax upon themselves. This provision is
attributable to Thomas Jefferson. I1 1867-68 DEBATES 1744. Jefferson began with the
proposition "that the earth belongs ... to the living; that the dead have neither powers
nor rights over it." Letter to James Madison, Sept. 6, 1789, in TnE LIFE AND SF=rCTa
WRITINGS oF THobAS JEFFEBSON 488 (A. Koch & J. Peden eds. 1944) (emphasis in original).
It follows from this proposition that one generation has no right to bind another. If one
generation can charge another for its debts, "then the earth would belong to the dead
and not to the living generation." Id. at 489. Jefferson continued: "The conclusion then,
is, that neither the representatives of a nation, nor the whole nation itself assembled, can
validly engage debts beyond what they may pay in their own time ....... Id. at 490.
Underlying Jefferson's thought is the idea that since debt reduces future options, it
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Before discussing the 1938 Convention, which produced New
York's present constitution, it is necessary to deal with the law of moral
obligation. The law of moral obligation has been said to permit the
state, or a city, to use its funds to pay off the bondholders of a defaulting
authority.
IV
TiE LAw OF MORAL OBLIGATION
The seminal decision on the law of moral obligation in New York
is an 1855 Court of Appeals case, Town of Guilford v. Board of Super-
visors.190 Two highway commissioners, Cornell and Clarke, had been
directed by a town meeting to bring an action on behalf of the town.
The suit involved the town's right to compensation from a private
turnpike company for the taking of a public highway and bridge.
Clarke and Cornell were defeated in this action and the town received
no compensation. 191 The commissioners then brought suit against the
town for the recovery of costs and expenses incurred in the prosecution
of the suit. Again Clarke and Cornell were defeated, this time on the
ground that the town meeting had no power to authorize the com-
missioners to prosecute the action. 192
Following this defeat, the commissioners sought relief from the
legislature. The legislature complied, passing a law requiring the town
to hold a referendum on the validity of the commissioner's claim and
the amount of compensation, if any.193 The statute provided that the
vote of the electors "shall be final and conclusive."' 94 The referendum
was held and the town, "by a large majority,"'195 rejected the claim.
is essentially antidemocratic. The point is equally valid today. Assume that one admini-
stration embarks on a massive program of public building. It borrows freely to the point
where 50% of the government's annual income must be paid for debt service. The burden
will remain for 30 or 40 years. A succeeding administration, elected to pursue different
policies, will have few options available to it. The government's income has been heavily
mortgaged and the debt must be paid. As Michael Hoffman told the 1846 Convention, a
bad law can be repealed but a bad debt cannot be.
The Jeffersonian provision was weakened in 1905 when the permissible period for
debt was increased from 18 to 50 years. N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM.,
REPORT: AMENDMENTS PROPOSED TO NEW YORK CONsTITUTION 1895-1937, at 549 (1938). It
was destroyed in 1918 when the requirement for the imposition of a tax was removed.
Id. at 556.
190 13 N.Y. 143 (1855).
191 Cornell v. Butternuts & Oxford Turnpike Co., 25 Wend. 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
192 Cornell v. Town of Guilford, 1 Denio 510 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
193 Act of Feb. 7, 1851, ch. 16, [1851] N.Y. Laws 17.
194 Id. § 3.
195 Town of Guilford v. Cornell, 18 Barb. 615, 640 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854).
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Again the commissioners turned to the legislature which now passed
"An act for the relief of Daniel Cornell and Ransom Clarke." 1 6 The
act provided for the appointment of three commissioners to determine
the amount of costs and expenses incurred by the luckless highway
commissioners. The statute further directed that the award be paid
by taxes imposed upon the town of Guilford. The town resisted, urging
that the statute was unconstitutional. 197
The question presented was whether taxes may be imposed to
pay a private claim that was legally unenforceable. The court held
that the legislative power to impose a tax for any purpose was not
limited by the constitution. It found further that the judiciary had no
power to review the legislative determination. There was one exception
to this rule-if what the legislature sought to accomplish was pro-
hibited by the constitution, the court would review and strike down
the act: "Independently of express constitutional restrictions, [the legis-
lature] can make appropriations of money whenever the public well
being requires or will be promoted by it; and it is the judge of what
is for the public good."'198
The above holdings were sufficient to dispose of the case. The
court went on, however, to give the first expression to the law of moral
obligation. It spoke of "claims founded in equity and justice" as
follows:
The legislature is not confined in its appropriations of the public
moneys, or of the sums to be raised by taxation in favor of indi-
viduals, to cases in which a legal demand exists against the state.
It can thus recognize claims founded in equity and justice in the
largest sense of these terms, or in gratitude or charity.199
Four years after Guilford, the court approved a legislative imposi-
tion requiring the city of Syracuse to pay extra compensation to a
sewer contractor.2-0 This was held valid despite a provision of the city's
charter prohibiting payments in excess of the agreed-upon contract
price.201 Guilford was cited for the proposition that the legislature may
190 Act of Feb. 5, 1852, ch. 8, [1852] N.Y. Laws 12.
197 The Court of Appeals had already held, in an opinion of Judge Ruggles, that
the 1846 constitution did not restrain the legislature's power to tax and to apportion the
tax. People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 (1851).
198 13 N.Y. at 149.
199 Id.
200 Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N.Y. 116 (1859).
201 In People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532 (1857), it had been held that the
power of the legislature over local affairs was complete. In that case, the court held that
there was no constitutional impediment to an act that removed the police function from
local control. The act established a metropolitan police district dominated by com-
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require taxation to meet a legally unenforceable claim, although a
normal business risk seems remote from the sympathetic case presented
by the highway commissioners. 20 2 In any case, the legislative award of
extra compensation to contractors became a general practice, and, in
the Constitutional Convention of 1867, an effort was made to prohibit
special legislative recognition of moral obligations.
The proposed constitution would have effected four major changes
with respect to private claims against the state.20 3 First, the legislature
was prohibited from auditing or allowing private claims. 204 Second, a
constitutional court denominated the Court of Claims was to be
created and given jurisdiction over private claims against the state.205
Third, the legislature was prohibited from passing special laws with
respect to such claims and could act only by general law.206 Finally, the
missioners appointed by the Governor. For discussions of home rule, see Richland,
Constitutional City Home Rule in New York (pts. 1-2), 54 CoLum. L. REv. 311 (1954),
55 COLUM. L. Rav. 598 (1955); Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 CoLuar.
L. REv. 1145 (1966).
202 It is hard to see any "equity and justice" in the claim of a sewer contractor who
has made a bad bargain with a city. There was no correlative rule requiring a contractor
to disgorge his profits if the contract turned out to be advantageous.
203 In its Address to the People, the Convention described the proposed constitu-
tional changes as follows:
We have created a court of claims for the adjudication of all demands
against the State, and taken away the power of the Legislature to pass laws in
relation to claims, thereby removing one prolific cause of frequent, interested,
and sometimes improvident legislation ....
Address of the Convention to the People of the State, Feb. 28, 1868, in V DOCUMErTS OF
THE CONvENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1867-68, No. 184, at 2-3 (1868) [hereinafter
cited as 1867-68 DOCUMENTS].
204 Article III, § 16, of the proposed constitution of 1868 provided:
The Legislature shall not audit or allow any private claim or account against the
State, or pass any special law in relation thereto, but may appropriate money to
pay such claims as shall have been audited and allowed according to law.
V 1867-68 DOCUMENTS, No. 185, at 12.
205 Article V, § 8, of the proposed constitution provided:
There shall be a Court of Claims, composed of three Judges appointed by the
Governor with the consent of the Senate, in which shall be adjudicated such
claims against the State as the Legislature shall by general laws direct.
V 1867-68 DocuMENTs, No. 185, at 19.
206 Note 204 supra. It was suggested that the legislature might abuse its power, even
by general laws, to determine which claims against the state could be adjudicated. Mr.
Alvord replied that it was necessary to leave the power in the legislature since the waiver
of sovereign immunity was experimental and might require limitations in the future.
Mr. Alvord stated:
We are relaxing the sovereignty of the State; and I trust that [it will be left]
... in the hands of the Legislature to say how far individuals shall be permitted
to go before the court, and how far the sovereignty of the State shall remain in
abeyance, in the decision of claims against the State.
V 1867-68 DEBATES 3647.
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legislature was prohibited, even by general law, from allowing claims
for extra compensation and claims barred by a statute of limitations.207
Mr. Lapham, a member of the committee that drafted these pro-
visions, explained the reasons for the constitutional changes as follows:
What is the evil which we are seeking to guard against? The
practice for many years has been that, when a claim has been de-
cided by the tribunal to which it is referred by law and decided to
be unwarranted and unjust, and consequently disallowed, to go
to the Legislature and ask its allowance; and we all regret to be
compelled to say that the application to the Legislature has gen-
erally been successful.2 08
The creation of the Court of Claims and the grant of power to the
legislature to pass general laws with respect to its jurisdiction con-
stituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. 0 9 General laws were to be
passed to cover all claims against the state.210 Furthermore, the Con-
vention was alert to the possibility of legislative abuse of the power to
pass general laws with respect to private claims, and, therefore, as men-
tioned above, the proposed constitution prohibited the legislature from
passing any law with respect to (1) extra compensation on contracts and
(2) any claim barred by a statute of limitations.211 The proposed con-
207 Article HI, § 17 (V 1867-68 DOCUMENTS, No. 185, at 12) (extra compensation);
Art. V, § 8 (V 1867-68 DOCUMENTS, No. 185, at 19) (statute of limitations).
208 IV 1867-68 DEBATES 2770.
209 The legislature could recognize a moral obligation only by passing a general law
requiring the Court of Claims to give. a remedy to all persons similarly situated. The
claim would then become a legal claim rather than a moral one. This is illustrated by the
following colloquy:
MR. MURPHY-I would like to ask the Chairman of the committee, if
I can get his ear for a moment, what he proposes to do with private claims
against the State which may not be embraced in those authorized to be audited
by general law. There may be cases of just claims against the State which may
not be embraced in the general laws authorizing this court of claims. My ques-
tion is, what is to become of such claims against the State under this provision
if no special laws shall be passed in relation to them?
MR. RATHBUN-My answer to the gentleman is that it seems to me there
can be no difficulty whatever in the Legislature passing a general law by which
every man having a claim against the State is entitled to go before the court
of claims and have it tried, because they might enact a law that all claims of
individuals-private claims-shall be tried in this court of claims, making the
law so broad that there can be no pretense of any claim, no matter how it
originated, that that court of claims would not have jurisdiction over it.
II id. at 1321.
210 See generally id. at 1319-20; IV id. at 2771, 2775.
211 Note 207 and accompanying text supra.
A resolution of the Convention provided for the publication of its debates by two
Albany newspapers. They were to have been reimbursed by the Convention at a rate of
$6.50 per column but not exceeding $6,000 to each paper for the entire proceedings.
The Convention lasted longer than expected and a resolution was therefore offered "that
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stitution, consequently, would have eliminated the law of moral obliga-
tion. The legislature could not act by special law; if it enacted a
general law covering a class of claims, any obligation arising thereunder
would be legal, not moral. With the exception of the Judiciary Article,
however, the proposed constitution was rejected by the people.212
The abuses caused by special legislative recognition of claims con-
tinued, and, in 1872, Governor Hoffman called for a constitutional
commission, noting that legislative awards of extra compensation had
tended "greatly to encumber the statute book, demoralize the Legisla-
ture, and deplete the treasury. '"2 13 The 1872 Constitutional Commission
acted to end the more flagrant abuses caused by the moral obligation
theory but did not attempt the drastic changes proposed by the 1867
constitution. Thus, the Commission rejected the proposal creating a
court of claims to adjudicate claims against the state.214 More im-
portantly, it failed to adopt the provision prohibiting the legislature
from passing special laws in relation to private claims.215 The Commis-
sion did adopt two provisions found in the defeated constitution: (1)
the prohibition of the legislative audit or allowance of claims;210 and
(2) the prohibition of extra compensation. 217
the limitation upon the gross amount to be paid the Albany Argus and Evening Journal,
for publishing verbatim reports of the proceedings of the Convention be changed .... "
V 1867-68 DEBATES 8869. The resolution was carried by a vote of 63 to 40, but it was
pointed out in the debates that if the proposed constitution had been in force it would
have been impossible for the papers to have obtained the extra compensation. Id. at
3870-73.
212 The constitution was defeated by a vote of 290,456 to 223,935. LEGISLATIVE MANUAL
316. The section creating the Court of Claims was not part of the Judiciary Article.
213 VI MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS 402-03 (C. Lincoln ed. 1909).
214 JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMIssION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 125-26
(1878).
215 Id. at 91, 160, 184. Another defeated constitution, the 1915 constitution, would
have prohibited such special laws. Article III, § 19, in IV RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK, 1915, at 4822 (1915) [hereinafter cited as 1915
RECORD].
216 N.Y. CONST. art. HII, § 19 (1874). A related provision prohibited the payment
of any claim barred by the statute of limitations. Id. art. VII, § 14. The present con-
stitution combines both provisions in Article III, § 19. In 1888 a board of claims was
created. In 1897 the board was transformed into the Court of Claims. 2 LINCOLN 826.
217 N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 24 (1874). This section prohibited the state or a locality
from granting extra compensation to "any public officer, servant, agent or contractor."
A related provision, Article VII, § 8, prohibited payment of any extra compensation to a
canal contractor. This section, however, permitted cancellation of the contract if the
canal board determined it to be "unjust and oppressive." The Committee on Canals
reported on this provision as follows:
It is believed that this provision, while it is evidently just and equitable,
will be of great value to the State. Many contracts have heretofore been taken
at prices known to be unremunerative, in the belief that upon subsequent
application to the Legislature the prices would be raised. In this way the pro-
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The Commission also expanded the gift and loan provisions.218
Since 1846, the constitution had prohibited the gift or loan of the
state's credit. Now this provision was broadened to also prohibit the
gift or loan of the state's money.219 It might seem that the prohibition
of a gift of money would result in the abolition of the law of moral
obligation, 220 but this was apparently not the Commission's intent;221
there would have been no need for a specific prohibition of extra com-
pensation if the law of moral obligation was to be eliminated. In sum,
the pattern of the 1874 amendments seems in the direction of con-
trolling and limiting moral obligations rather than abolishing them.
Guilford had held that the legislative powers of taxation and ap-
propriation were unlimited. The only exception to this was that these
powers could not be used in violation of the constitution. In 1876, the
court added a further qualification in Weismer v. Village of Douglas.222
There, the legislature had authorized the village to issue bonds and to
invest the proceeds in the stock of a private lumber company. The
dividends on the stock were to be applied to the debt service on the
village bonds, but, if, as expected, the dividends were insufficient for
that purpose, the village was required to impose taxes. After making
several interest payments out of taxes, the village refused further pay-
ment on the bonds. The bondholders brought suit, arguing that under
Guilford the taxing power of the legislature was unrestricted. 223 The
court, however, limited the Guilford holding and found that a public
purpose must be present. The bondholders argued further that a
public purpose was present since the lumber mill would create job
opportunities and increase the village's taxable base. The court re-
jected this, noting that "these are not the direct and immediate public
uses and purpose to which money taken by tax may be directed." 224
visions of the present Constitution for letting contracts to the lowest bidder
have been practically evaded, and by shrewd, not to say corrupt, management,
great sums of money have been improperly obtained from the State.
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 428 (1878).
218 See notes 72 & 80 and accompanying text supra.
219 N.Y. CONsT. art. VIII, § 10 (1874).
220 A moral obligation assumes payment where there is no legal obligation. Payment
of a non-legal obligation would normally be viewed as a gift. Such payment would there-
fore be prohibited.
221 It is difficult to ascertain the Commission's intent since no record of its debates
was kept. The only record of its proceedings, aside from certain committee reports, is
the Journal, which is simply a report of action taken by the Commission.
222 64 N.Y. 91 (1876).
223 The case was governed by the pre-1874 constitution. The 1874 amendments
prohibited a village from becoming a stockholder in a corporation. N.Y. CONST. art. VII,
§ 11(1874).
224 64 N.Y. at 103. See also the discussion of the Batchellor case, notes 159-64 and
accompanying text supra.
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As Weismer added the public purpose qualification to the law of
moral obligation, so in 1886 the notion that the claim must be founded
in "equity and justice" was formulated in Cole "v. State.225 This case
involved compensation for certain harbor officials in the port of New
York. Cole was appointed captain of the port in 1880. In 1883 the
legislature passed a law authorizing the Governor to appoint a captain
of the harbor; the act contained an appropriation providing for salaries
and expenses. Apparently, the Governor did not exercise his power
of appointment under this statute, and Cole continued to act as captain
of the port on a hold-over basis. Subsequently, the state refused pay-
ment of Cole's salary and expenses on the grounds that he was not
entitled to hold the office and that the 1883 act abolished his tenure so
that his services since then had been as a volunteer.
In 1885 the legislature conferred jurisdiction on the board of
claims "to hear, audit and determine the claims" of Cole and other
harbor officials. The board's determination was favorable to Cole and
his associates. The state argued that the 1885 act violated the constitu-
tional prohibition against the legislative allowance of claims. 226 The
court agreed that the legislature could not allow a claim but found no
attempt to do so in the 1885 act; the act merely said that the board was
to "determine" the claim. The court stated: "The power to hear and
determine includes power to reject as well as to allow."227 The court
did not decide whether the claim was a legal or moral one but con-
cluded that "it had a basis in justice and equity."228 It further found
that there was no violation of the constitution.229
Although the vague standards inherent in the "public purpose"
and "equity and justice" criteria did not present serious obstacles to
the state's assuming moral obligations, 230 until 1926 the courts con-
sistently held that no payment of a claim could be made in violation
225 102 N.Y. 48, 6 N.E. 277 (1886).
226 Oddly, the state did not base its argument on the constitutional prohibition
against a gift of money. This position could have been argued with force.
227 102 N.Y. at 52, 6 N.E. at 278 (emphasis in original).
228 Id. at 58, 6 N.E. at 281.
229 The court reaffirmed the Guilford holding that no obligation could be paid in
violation of the constitution: "Where the creation of a particular class of liabilities is
prohibited by the Constitution, it would of course be an infraction of that instrument
to pass any law authorizing their enforcement .... " Id. at 54, 6 N.E. at 279.
230 The application of these qualifications on the law of moral obligation has led
to peculiar results. For example, a claim of war veterans has been held to lack "justice
and equity." People v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 134 N.E. 698 (1921).
On the other hand, the claim of bondholders-whose bonds contained a disclaimer of
state liability-has been held to possess "justice and equity." Williamsburgh Say. Bank
v. State, 243 N.Y. 281, 153 N.E. 58 (1926).
[Vol. 56:521
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AUTHORITIES
of constitutional prohibitions.2 31 This idea had been an essential ele-
ment of the law of moral obligation since its original formulation in
Guilford, but in 1926, without discussion of the issue, the Court of
Appeals broke with this vital principle in Williamsburgh Savings Bank
v. State.232
In 1910 the State Water Supply Commission issued $200,000 worth
of five percent bonds on behalf of the Canaseraga Creek Improvement
District. The District had been created pursuant to state law in order
to regulate the flow of water in the creek.233 Two years prior to the
bond issue, the Court of Appeals had discussed the law noting that
"[i]t nowhere assumes to pledge the credit of the state .... -234 The
bonds were to be paid from a special fund; i.e., the assessments imposed
on the benefited lands. After the "improvements" had been completed,
an attempt was made to assess the benefited lands in the amount of
$382,385. The landowners resisted, claiming that the improvements had
in fact been of little or no value. After trial, it was determined that the
landowners were largely correct-the supreme court found the value of
the improvements to be under $30,000.235 The district bonds were
defaulted; apparently the bondholders were in trouble.
In 1923, however, the legislature authorized the Court of Claims
to determine if the bondholders' claim was founded in equity and
justice. If the court so found, "the state shall be deemed to have been
liable" on the bonds.23 6 There could be no question that the state was
not liable on the bonds. No referendum was held; no tax was imposed
for their payment; none of the constitutional provisions had been
complied with. Further, the Court of Appeals had already said that the
credit of the state was not behind the district bonds.237
231 Thus, an act establishing a pension system for "decrepit" teachers was struck down
on the ground that it provided extra compensation. In re Mahon, 171 N.Y. 263, 63 N.E.
1107 (1902). On the same ground, a 1919 act authorizing extra payments on "war con-
tracts" was held invalid. Gordon v. State, 233 N.Y. 1, 134 N.E. 698 (1922).
232 243 N.Y. 231, 153 N.E. 58 (1926).
The necessity of the principle is obvious: any state action, including the payment of
a claim, must be governed by the state's fundamental law.
233 N.Y. BDs. & Cosxu'Ns LAw, 4 N.Y. CONSOL. LAws 5352 (1909); Act of April 22, 1907,
ch. 195, [1907] N.Y. Laws 278; Act of May 11, 1906, ch. 418, [1906] N.Y. Laws 1016; Act
of May 14, 1904, ch. 734, [1904] N.Y. Laws 1872.
234 State Water Supply Comm'n v. Curtis, 192 N.Y. 319, 328, 85 N.E. 148, 151 (1908).
The court refused to pass on the constitutionality of the law, although that question
had been certified to it by the appellate division. Id. at 331, 85 N.E. at 152.
235 People ex rel. Morey v. Pratt (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1922), reprinted in Record on Appeal
to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York at 283, Williamsburgh Say. Bank v.
State, 243 N.Y. 231, 153 N.E. 58 (1926). For the master's assessment of value, see id. at 275.
236 Act of May 28, 1923, ch. 830, § 3, [1923] N.Y. Laws 1490.
237 Nor was the argument available that a debt unconstitutionally contracted may
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The Court of Claims held that the bondholders' claim was not
founded in equity or justice.238  The appellate division, on other
grounds, affirmed the Court of Claims.23 9 The bondholders appealed to
the Court of Appeals. Now, the 1852 prediction of Judge Ruggles was
to come true. In Newell, another special fund case, Ruggles had warned
that if a special fund proved deficient, the state would become liable
on the bonds. He noted that it "might give rise to objection and con-
troversy; but sooner or later, the claim would prevail, and could not
be effectually resisted." 240
The Court of Appeals held in Williamsburgh that the state must
be made liable for the debt. The court essentially believed that the
state was too heavily involved in the transaction to permit it to deny
liability. It noted that the state "started on its disastrous course the
improvement plan which has become the source of so much trouble."241
Further, the district was "acting under [the state's] .. .authority."124
The state had "permitted one of its agencies to gather into its treasury
moneys of its citizens .... "243 Therefore, the state cannot "stand un-
responsive when asked to relieve those whom indirectly at least it has
brought into an unhappy predicament, by retiring obligations which
in essence and equity are its own. " 244 The decision breached the con-
sistent holdings that a moral obligation could not create a class of
liability forbidden by the constitution by ignoring the constitutional
prohibition against the creation of state debt except by referendum. 245
be paid. This position was taken by the Attorney General in People ex tel. Hopkins v.
Board of Supervisors, 52 N.Y. 556 (1873). The court did not agree with this position. It
stated:
If no debt existed, there was no necessity for borrowing money. . . .A debt of
$6,000,000, or liabilities to that amount, and resting as a burden upon the people,
resulting from the acts of the legislature and the agents and officers of the State,
is an impossibility, for the reason that it is absolutely prohibited; and any
attempt to create such debt or incur such liability is a nullity. . . .Neither the
legislature nor the officers and agents of the State, or all combined, can create
a debt or incur an obligation for or in behalf of the State, except to the amount
and in the manner provided for in the Constitution.
Id. at 563.
238 The Court of Claims decision is reprinted in the Record on Appeal to the Court
of Appeals of the State of New York at 71-103, Williamsburgh Say. Bank v. State, 243
N.Y. 231, 153 N.E. 58 (1926).
239 213 App. Div. 737, 211 N.Y.S. 420 (3d Dep't 1925).
240 See note 138 and accompanying text supra.
241 243 N.Y. at 245, 153 N.E. at 63.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 246, 153 N.E. at 63.
244 Id.
245 Strangely, none of these issues was raised by the litigants or discussed by the
court.
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The Williamsburgh decision was not only bad in itself but it be-
came more ominous in view of the proliferation of public authorities
during the 1930's. In two cases, the Court of Appeals held that the
legislature could create an entity, known as an authority, which was
unbounded by the constitutional provisions that restrain the govern-
ment itself.2 46 The state involvement argument, successful in Williams-
burgh, seemed equally persuasive in the case of an authority. The
authority, too, was created by the state; it purportedly fulfilled govern-
mental purposes; its officials were appointed by the Governor; and its
properties were granted tax exemptions. If an authority defaulted on its
bonds would Williamsburgh permit the state to "stand unresponsive"?
The question troubled the delegates to the 1938 Convention, and they
addressed themselves to it.
V
THE 1938 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The 1938 Convention assembled in Albany on April 5, 1938.247
The Convention adopted a constitution on August 24,248 and decided
to submit it to the people in the form of nine separate questions.2 49
246 Gaynor v. Marohn, 268 N.Y. 417, 198 N.E. 13 (1935); Robertson v. Zimmermann,
268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935). In a sense, a public authority is a type of special fund.
Newell had held that state special fund debt must comply with the normal constitutional
provisions governing debt. However, Newell was not discussed in either Gaynor or Zim-
mermann. Newell was discussed in Kelly v. Merry, 262 N.Y. 151, 186 N.E. 425 (1933), in
which a village undertook to develop its own electric utility. The court decided that
a conditional sales contract for electric generators was not a contract involving an "ex-
penditure" within the meaning of the Village Law. The Village Law provided that the
village could not enter into a contract involving an "expenditure" unless (1) provision
was made for its payment by taxation, or (2) a resolution had been adopted authorizing
borrowing. Act of April 6, 1928, ch. 852, [1928] N.Y. Laws 1818 (repealed 1954). These
provisions were not complied with. The court held the contract valid, noting that it
provided for payment only from the revenue of the lighting plant, and that "[t]he debt
was not a general indebtedness of the village." Id. at 159, 186 N.E. at 428. The case was
overruled by the 1938 constitution which provided that all local indebtedness must be
backed by the faith and credit of the locality. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
247 I REVISED RECORD OF THE CONsTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEw
YoRK, 1938, at 3 (1938) [hereinafter cited as 1938 Rxv s RxcoRD].
248 IV id. at 3467-68.
249 Id. at 3534. There were a number of considerations underlying the Convention's
decision to submit the constitution as a series of separate propositions rather than as a
whole. Former Governor Alfred E. Smith explained to the Convention that submission
as a whole would surely cause defeat of the constitution. Id. at 3486. Smith reasoned
that any proposed constitution started with a handicap of 500,000 negative votes, repre-
senting the "people that will be against everything." Id. Submission as a whole would
cause opponents of particular provisions to combine against the constitution which, to-
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The Convention made the first question a general provision containing
all material as to which there was "little or no dispute."250 The remain-
ing eight questions covered the more controversial amendments relating
to such matters as labor, apportionment, elimination of railroad grade
crossings, proportional representation, and slum clearance and low-rent
housing.251 On November 8, 1938, six questions were ratified by the
people and three were defeated. 252
By the time of the 1938 Convention, the state had created thirty-
three agencies known as "authorities" or "public corporations." 2 3 In
essence, the authority concept involved the statutory creation of a
separate entity that was intended to be self-supporting out of tolls or
other fees. Typically, an authority would operate a revenue-producing
asset such as a tunnel, bridge, or parkway.254 Also typically, an authority
would finance construction of its assets by the sale of bonds. The bond-
holders, by a contract with the authority known as an indenture or a
resolution, would impose various restrictions on the authority in order
gether with the initial handicap, would result in the constitution's defeat. Id. at 3486-87
(Governor Smith), 3492 (Senator Wagner). A further consideration in favor of separate
submission was that it was "more democratic." Id. at 3493 (Senator Wagner).
250 Id. at 3486.
251 Id. at 3472-74, 3506-08.
252 LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 329-30.
The 1938 constitution may be around for some time. The constitution itself pro-
vides that every twentieth year, and at such other times as the legislature may provide,
there shall be submitted to the people the question: "Shall there be a convention to re-
vise the constitution and amend the same?" N.Y. CONsT. art. XIX, § 2. In 1957 the
people answered such a question in the negative. LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 339. In 1967
a convention was held, but the resulting constitution was submitted as a whole to the
people (id. at 349) and was decisively defeated by an almost three-to-one margin (id.).
253 N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM., REPORT- PROBLEMS RELATING TO
HOME RULE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT 239-40 (1938).
Apparently the first authorities in New York were formed under a 1915 law autho-
rizing the creation of river regulation districts. Act of May 20, 1915, ch. 662,
[1915] N.Y. Laws 2208. The statute provided that such districts were to be "public
corporations." Id. § 431, [1915] N.Y. Laws 2212. The board of the corporation was to be
appointed by the Governor. Id. § 436, [1915] N.Y. Laws 2215. The statute further pro-
vided that the bonds of the corporation were not the debt of the state and that the
state "shall not be obligated to pay" on such bonds. Id. § 464, [1915] N.Y. Laws 2232.
For a discussion of whether this "new species" of entity could be characterized as a civil
division of the state, see 1915 REcoRD 753-55.
254 Recently, authorities have shown an inclination towards other types of revenue-
producing property such as commercial office buildings and luxury housing. Thus, the
Port of New York Authority has undertaken construction of the World Trade Center
which will contain 9,000,000 square feet of office space. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1970, § 8,
at 6 (table). Similarly, the Battery Park Authority intends to provide for the construction
of 5,000,000 square feet of commercial office space and 5,000 units of luxury housing. Agree-
ment of Lease Between the City of New York, as Lessor, and the Battery Park City
Authority, as Lessee, dated Nov. 24, 1969, Schedule A, at 1, 14 A.
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to protect their investment. The validity of an authority as a separate
entity apart from the state was upheld by the Court of Appeals in
Robertson v. Zimmermann,255 and as a separate entity, the authority
was free of normal governmental restrictions on the creation of debt
such as the state requirement of a referendum and the local debt limit
requirements.
The 1938 Convention was the first opportunity for examination
of the authority device by a constitutional convention. Robert Moses,
a delegate to the Convention, was generally considered the foremost
proponent and developer of the authority concept; at the time of the
Convention he was Chairman of the powerful and successful Tri-
borough Bridge and Tunnel Authority.256 Moses took the position that
there was no need for constitutional recognition of the authority device
and certainly no need for the imposition of restrictions upon authori-
ties.257 As the Convention proceeded, however, it became clear to Moses
that a distinct threat to the authority notion was developing. He re-
sponded by submitting to the delegates of the Convention two memo-
randa, the first dated July 25, 1938,258 and the second dated August 8,
1938.259 The Moses memoranda were in opposition to two proposals,
one by Mr. Abbott Low Moffat and the other by Professor Philip
Halpern.
The Moffat proposal provided: (1) that no public corporation
(authority) could be created with both the power to contract indebted-
ness and the power to collect charges or fees for facilities furnished
except by "special act" of the legislature;260 (2) that every authority
255 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935).
256 Mr. Moses was also Chairman of the Jones Beach State Parkway Authority, the
Bethpage Park Authority and ex officio head of the New York City Parkway Authority.
Memorandum to the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention by Robert Moses, with
Relation to Public Authorities 1 (July 25, 1938) [hereinafter cited as Moses Memorandum
I].
257 Moses Memorandum I. He apparently was well-pleased with the existing state
of the law with respect to authorities, particularly the Zimmermann and Williamsburgh
cases.
258 Moses Memorandum I.
259 Memorandum to the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention by Robert
Moses, with Relation to Public Authorities (Aug. 8, 1938) [hereinafter cited as Moses
Memorandum II].
260 The 1846 constitution required that private corporations be formed under gen-
eral laws and prohibited their creation by special act. Now N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 1. Mr.
Moffat explained that he wished "to require the Legislature to pass directly itself upon
the establishment of each new authority, and to prevent the enactment of general laws
pursuant to which a municipal corporation can itself create a corporation of the author-
ity type." HI 1938 RvIs.D RxcoRD 2259. Since authorities "have been created primarily
to evade the tax limitations in the Constitution," it would be an "anomaly" to impose
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consist of not less than three members; 261 (3) that the accounts of every
authority be subject to the supervision of the State Comptroller;2 2 and
(4) that the Williamsburgh "moral obligation" holding be constitu-
tionally overruled. To accomplish this last point Moffat proposed that
neither the state nor any political subdivision "shall at any time be
liable for the payment of obligations issued by [an authority] . . . nor
may the legislature accept, authorize acceptance of or impose such
liability upon the state or any political subdivision .... -263 This
provision was designed to eliminate a critical element in the security
of an authority's bonds; i.e., the generalized belief that in the last
debt limitations upon a locality "and then place within its control the power to evade
these limitations." Id. at 2259-60. In addition, Moffat believed that the creation of public
corporations was a part of the sovereign power and "should be retained by the people and
should not be delegated." Id. at 2260.
The constitution contains no definition of "special act." In 1969 the Court of Appeals
determined that the Metropolitan Transportation Authority had been created by a special
act. City of Rye v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 627, 249 N.E.2d 429, 301
N.Y.S.2d 569 (1969). This authority was created by Act of May 2, 1967, ch. 717, § 83,
[1967] N.Y. Laws 1868. Chapter 717 is comprised of 72 pages dealing with a large number
of matters other than the creation of the MTA. The majority thought that the special
act requirement was met if an authority was created by a "particular creative enactment"
of the legislature. 24 N.Y.2d at 634, 249 N.E.2d at 432, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 573. The evil
that the 1938 Convention sought to prohibit was, according to the majority, the delega-
tion of the power to create an authority to either administrative officers or local govern-
ments. Id. In reaching this conclusion the majority relied upon Moffat's statement that
the "power to create an authority shall not be delegated." Id. The dissenting opinion
of Judges Burke, Fuld, and Keating took the position that the 1938 Convention sought
to accomplish something more. The special act requirement, in its view, was intended
not only to prevent delegation but also to provide public notice. The dissent noted:
When one reads the legislative history of section 5 of article X, it is evident
that the reason for its enactment was broader than that attributed to it by the
majority. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, the creation of public
authorities was a cause for public concern. It was apparent that such authorities,
given broad power in specified and delimited areas, were virtually autonomous
once unleashed. Cognizant of the ineffectiveness of public reaction upon the
activities of an existing authority, the People of New York State insisted upon the
requirement of a special act at the time of creation. In this manner, interested
citizens were afforded an opportunity to speak out against a proposed authority.
In effect, this was the public's sole avenue for circumscribing the proposed delega-
tion of powers to a particular authority.
Id. at 641-42, 249 N.E.2d at 436, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
261 This provision was later deleted from the Moffat proposal. Moffat's argument
was simply that no one man should be vested with the "absolute powers" conferred upon
authorities. I 1938 REvisED REcoiw 2260-61.
262 This provision was later modified to provide that the accounts of a local authority
would be subject to the supervision of the local comptroller and to remove the Port
of New York Authority from its coverage.
263 I PROPOsED AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTrrTTONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
NEw YORK, 1938, Int. 356, Pr. 375, at 2 (1938).
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analysis the government will "bail out" the bondholders of an authority
in financial trouble.26 4
The Halpern proposal was directed at a more narrow problem. In
the previously mentioned Zimmermann case, the Court of Appeals
had upheld an act of the legislature creating the Buffalo Sewer Au-
thority against the contention that it permitted evasion of the city's
debt limit. Halpern's proposal would prevent creation, without a city
referendum, of an authority with both the power to contract indebted-
ness and collect charges for services (except from occupants of the
authority's premises) if such services were "of a character or nature
then or formerly furnished or supplied by the city. '265 The proposal
was therefore designed to overrule the Zimmermann case.
Halpern's proposal, according to the Moses memoranda, was de-
fective in that (1) it contained no definition of "public corporation"-
the legislature could therefore define the term as it pleased, and the
amendment would be of no effect; 266 (2) it would require numerous
and expensive referenda; 267 and (3) it "is aimed primarily to prevent
the establishment of agencies like the Buffalo Sewer Commission," and,
as a matter of constitutional policy, "there is no reason to load up the
Constitution of the State with specific prohibitions . *."..,268
Moffat's ideas, when compared to the Halpern proposal, were
"even more unnecessary and preposterous" in Mr. Moses's view.269
Mr. Moses raised a number of technical objections but his essential
points were: (1) the authority concept need not be mentioned or recog-
nized in the constitution; 270 (2) the proposed amendment to the state
constitution would impair the c6ntractual obligation to bondholders
264 Bondholders appear confident of a "bail out" because (1) the authority's asset
(a bridge or tunnel) typically is necessary to the city or state; (2) an authority default
might reflect upon the credit of the state or city; and (3) the authority's lobbyists have
been successful in the past. Of course, the Williamsburgh case did nothing to discourage
bondholder confidence.
265 III PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, 1938, Int. 596, Pr. 624, 777, 835, 872, at 2 (1938).
266 Moses Memorandum I, at 2; Moses Memorandum II, at 2.
267 Moses Memorandum I, at 3-4; Moses Memorandum II, at 3-5.
268 Moses Memorandum H, at 5. As it turned out, not even a "specific prohibition"
was enough. In Comereski v. Elmira, 808 N.Y. 248, 125 N.E.2d 241 (1955), the court
relied upon Zimmermann for the proposition that authorities are not "a mere evasion of
the constitutional debt limitations," even if the city conveyed valuable property to the
authority. Id. at 254, 125 N.E.2d at 244. The force of Zimmermann should be considered
muted in view of its treatment by the 1938 Convention. See text accompanying notes 321-28
infra.
269 Moses Memorandum I, at 4; Moses Memorandum II, at 5.
270 Moses Memorandum II, at 1, 9.
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in violation of the Federal Constitution;271 and (3) the prohibition
against governmental liability for the obligations of authorities was
improper since, "[i]n the case of default the state or city should have
the right to pay off the [authority's] debts and take over the [authority's
function]."2 72 Of course, this "right" to pay off a defaulting authority's
debts was what the Moffat proposal sought to preclude.
The Moffat proposal was referred to the Committee on the Legisla-
ture and Its Powers. 273 Halpern's proposal was originally referred to
the Committee on State Finance 274 but was later transferred to the
Committee on the Legislature and Its Powers. After being reported out,
the two proposals came before the Convention on August 8, 1938. The
second Moses memorandum was distributed to the delegates the same
day. The day's debate began with Mr. Moffat explaining the need for
his provision. He believed the history of authorities demonstrated a
development from an originally legitimate purpose to a system that
271 Id. 2t 7.
The memorandum stated:
The Moffat amendment undoubtedly constitutes an attempt to violate the
contracts made in connection with these Authority projects. These bond agree-
ments are of a most complicated and elaborate nature. They impose much stricter
rules of construction, maintenance and financing than are imposed by any govern-
ment agency of any kind. They provide for the strictest kind of business manage-
ment. They even restrict the amount which can be expended in any one year
for operation and a clear default to the bondholders if this amount is exceeded.
These contracts are protected by the Constitution of the United States. They can-
not be changed even by an amendment to the State Constitution without a fore-
closure by the bondholders. These agreements cannot be tinkered with on any
academic theories spun by those who have never had a day's experience in the
financing and administration of projects of this kind.
Id.
272 Moses Memorandum I, at 6; Moses Memorandum II, at 8.
Authority statutes, with few exceptions, contain express disclaimers that the bonds
of the authority shall not be a debt of state or city and that neither shall be liable
thereon. E.g., N.Y. Pawi. Hous. FIN. LAW § 46(8) (McKinney 1962) (Housing Finance
Agency); N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 564 (McKinney 1970) (Triborough Bridge and Tunnel
Authority); id. § 159 (Jones Beach State Parkway Authority). Such statutory disclaimers
are believed essential if an authority is to be upheld as a separate entity with separate
debt rather than as an arm of the state. See Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N.Y. 52, 196
N.E. 740 (1935). The recently enacted Urban Development Corporation Act, N.Y. UN-
CONSOL. LAWs §§ 6251-85 (McKinney Supp. 1970), unlike existing precedent, contains no
statutory disclaimer. The draftsmen apparently intended the absence of a disclaimer
to be meaningful. It would not, therefore, be appropriate to imply a disclaimer where
the law fails to provide one; the draftsmen of the Urban Development Corporation Act
must have meant to create state debt. The constitution prohibits the creation of state
debt, with exceptions not pertinent here, without a referendum. As a result, the statute is
unconstitutional, even under the Zimmermann test.
273 I 1938 REvIsm REcoan 208.
274 Id. at 258. The Halpern amendment now comprises N.Y. CoNsr. art. X, § 5
(2d ). The Moffat proposal constitutes id. (1st, 3d, 4th ).
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had "degenerated into a debt-evading device." 275 At first, the authority
idea was created to permit a unified approach to problems involving
different jurisdictions. 276 Thus, the problem of commerce in the port
of New York requiring the cooperation of New York, New Jersey, and
a number of cities led to the 1921 compact creating the Port of New
York Authority.277 Similarly, in 1927, the Lake Champlain Bridge
Authority was created by compact to "handle a single work where two
jurisdictions were involved."278 But, Moffat continued, "[v]ery shortly
after that there came a whole deluge of authorities in this State, most
of which were established simply to evade debt limitations imposed in
the Constitution"; with a single exception, "they had nothing to do
with jurisdictional lines." 279
A suggestion simply to prohibit the future creation of authorities
had been made to the Finance Committee.2 0 Moffat did not subscribe
to that; he believed that authorities were necessary and that some had
"proved of inestimable value." 281 The authority has a "definite place
in the governmental structure of the State," and, consequently, the
constitution should "specify the minimum requirements relating to
their organization, just as the Constitution recognizes other municipal
corporations." 2 2
Whether there should be such recognition was, of course, the
threshold question. Moffat maintained that authorities must be recog-
nized and domesticated; that before radical shifts were made in the
character of the state's governmental structure, some constitutional
275 III 1938 REvisiD REcoRD 2259.
276 Id. at 2258-59.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 2259.
279 Id.
In large measure, the federal government was responsible for the deluge of authorities.
Beginning in 1933, the national government offered funds to localities for various public
works in order to relieve unemployment caused by the Depression. Id. Frequently, how-
ever, the city was too dose to its debt limit to permit it to raise its share of the cost.
The solution was to establish an authority. Id.
Governor Smith commented on the creation of the Buffalo Sewer Authority as fol-
lows:
Whenever government gets off on the wrong foot it is pretty hard to get back
in step again, and when the PWA dangled a little bunch of money before the
City of Buffalo, and said, "Here is our share for your sewer. You go and raise
your share," and the City of Buffalo finds out that under the constitutional debt
limit it can not raise its share, what does it do? It sets up an authority. A sewer
never can be made a self-liquidating project. (Laughter.)
Id. at 2287.
280 Id. at 2259.
281 Id.
282 Id.
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provision was necessary.28  The importance of constitutional recog-
nition of a new kind of governmental unit was emphasized by the
absence of public control over authorities; that is, was it consistent with
democratic government to permit large aggregations of wealth, accumu-
lated through the performance of governmental functions, to exist
beyond the control of publicly-elected officials?28 4 As Moffat expressed
the point: "Authorities are corporate governmental agencies with
extraordinary powers. Were the locality itself performing the functions
assigned to an authority, all steps, all appropriations, would be subject
to the approval of the duly elected representatives of the people."28 5
If authorities are to be constitutionally recognized, what essential
ground rules should be formulated? It could be provided that the
debt of an authority could be issued only under the same conditions
that the government may issue its debt. That is, the debt of a local
authority would be included within the municipal debt limit and the
debt of a state authority would require a referendum. Moffat was not
prepared to adopt this approach. He instead took the view that author-
ity debt could be freely issued but it must be clear that such debt was
283 This position was elaborated in a 1938 Report of the Constitutional Convention
Commission as follows:
[T]he importance of the authority, and at the same time its significance as an
issue which must sooner or later be met, constitutionally or otherwise, is that
it is now included in the governmental setup as an additional function, a unique
and important one, which has come into being with comparatively little of the
excitement usually attending the creation of any additional governmental unit,
much less the creation of a new kind of governmental unit. No less than a
revolution accompanied the creation of the Federal form of government in
America, while protracted debates in convention or Legislature by the leading
political lights of the day marked the inauguration of fundamental changes in
city, village, town and county government.
N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM., supra note 253, at 243 (emphasis in
original).
284 Although the members of an authority are generally appointed by public
officials, they may or may not be subject to removal. For example, the Triborough
Bridge and Tunnel Authority Act (N.Y. PuB. AuTh. LAW § 552 (McKinney 1970)) and
the Jones Beach State Parkway Authority Act (id. § 152) do not provide for removal.
Those statutes that do provide for removal require that it be for "inefficiency, neglect
of duty or misconduct in office" after a hearing. E.g., N.Y. Pray. Hous. FIN. LAW § 43(5)
(McKinney 1962) (Housing Finance Agency); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1973(5) (McKinney
1970) (Battery Park Authority); id. § 1263(7) (Metropolitan Transportation Authority);
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWs § 6254(8) (McKinney Supp. 1970) (Urban Development Corpora-
tion). Differences in policy would clearly not justify removal. The authors have not been
able to find an instance where a member of an authority was removed.
285 III 1938 RlvisEo REcoR 2260.
As previously discussed, the state, with minor exceptions, may not constitutionally
issue debt without a referendum. A city may not issue debt in excess of its constitutional
debt limit. See notes 67-100, 185-89 and accompanying text supra. The constitutional
pattern is destroyed if these requirements may be avoided by the creation of an authority.
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authority debt and not the debt of the state or city. Thus, an authority
could pledge its assets and revenues as security for its bondholders,
but the bondholders would neither purchase nor be entitled to the
credit of the state or city.286
A Report of the Constitutional Convention Commission to the
1938 Convention had noted that "it is not certain as to what would
happen if an authority were not able to meet its obligations." 2 7 The
Report stated that all authority statutes specifically contain a disclaimer,
providing that the government shall not be liable for the bonds of the
authority.288 To the date of the Convention, the Report observed, no
authority had defaulted; several, however, "might have defaulted had
the State not come to their rescue with some form of open or hidden
subsidy."2 9 The Report concluded from this that behind "the authority
stands, therefore, an implied liability of the government creating it. 280
The Report's most significant point was that the question of im-
plied governmental liability was "uncertain." Mr. Moffat sought to
remove any uncertainty from the matter. His provision stated that
neither the "state nor any political subdivision thereof shall at any
time be liable for the payment of any obligations issued" by an author-
ity "heretofore or hereafter created. ' 29 1 To this point, the provision
could be viewed as a constitutional version of the statutory disclaimer
and possibly subject to a Williamsburgh type of evasion. The provision
continued, however, to eliminate the possibility of a future Williams-
burgh: "nor may the legislature accept, authorize acceptance of or im-
286 Authority bonds always pay a greater rate of interest than governmental bonds.
A 1938 Report of the Constitutional Convention Commission to the Convention noted
that the "authority device is an expensive method of financing." TAXATION & FINANCE
356. See also N.Y. DEP'T OF AUDIT & CONTROL, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER, 1963
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 97, at 3. The higher interest rate paid to authority bondholders
should represent compensation for a greater risk undertaken. Unfortunately, the bond-
holder proponents desired both higher interest rates and the implied liability of govern-
ment in the event of authority default.
287 TAXATION & FINANCE 356.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id. The Report viewed Williamsburgh as holding the state liable on bonds
despite a statutory disclaimer:
In the Williamsburg[h] Savings Bank case . . . . the Court of Appeals imposed
legal liability on the State because of the moral obligation resulting from the cre-
ation of the Canaseraga River Improvement District although the bonds were is-
sued, pursuant to statute, "without liability on the part of the State beyond the
proportion of any assessment to be made or certified against the State on account
of said improvement."
Id. n.14, quoting Act of July 12, 1911, ch. 647, § 459, [1911] N.Y. Laws 1528.
291 I PRoPosED AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORE, 1938, Int. 356, Pr. 375, at 2 (1938).
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pose such liability upon the state or any political subdivision thereof."
In other words, in the future, there would be no "moral obligation"
owed to authority bondholders. 292
Moffat concluded his initial statement by offering an amendment
to his proposal to permit the state or a locality to take over an author-
ity. This amendment was consistent with Moffat's overall approach
that nothing should prevent government from recapturing a function.
He explained that "if the State or a locality wants to take over the
function of the authority, and put it really into its own activity, it
should have the right to buy out the authority."293 The buy out amend-
ment provided that the state or city could, "if authorized by the
Legislature, acquire the properties of [an authority] and pay the in-
debtedness thereof."294
Moses responded to the Moffat statement by observing that he did
not "know whether to feel flattered that my friend down here is trying
to give so much attention in the Constitution to prevent one man from
getting something accomplished." 295 Moses denied that authorities were
created to evade municipal debt limits, 296 but he was less than clear
about his theory as to why they were created. Rhetorically, he asked
himself, why was the Triborough Bridge Authority created? He an-
swered: "[T]he authority could be sustained by tolls. You can call that
debt evasion if you please. I call it sound business .... ,297 In addition,
it is probably fair to say that at least part of the Moses theory of the
creation of authorities is that they can accomplish more in a short time
than government. He repeatedly returned to this theme in describing
the accomplishments of his authorities, of the bridges and parkways
he had constructed when government had foundered.298 In response
292 Id. Moffat explained the purpose of his provision to the Convention as follows:
Every single one of these authorities without exception provides in the statute
that the State shall not be liable, or a political subdivision shall not be liable
on the bonds of that authority. Yet, under the Williamsburg[h Savings Bank
case, it is perfectly possible that the Legislature might authorize suit on the
bonds of one of these authorities, and, in an action similar to the action in the
Williamsburg[h] Savings Bank [case] it might be found by the Court of Appeals
that the Legislature by its action in passing such legislation, recognized the
liability, and the State had to make good on the bonds.
III 1938 REvisED RiEcoR 2262-63.
293 Id. at 2263.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 2264.
297 Id. This answer is unclear. It may mean that all profitable operations should
be placed in authorities and made tax exempt, leaving government all losing operations
such as police, fire, and welfare. It would seem more reasonable to use profitable bridge
or tunnel operations to make up deficits in other governmental functions.
298 Id. at 2263-65.
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to Moffat's point that authorities were unregulated, Moses spoke of his
bondholders' agreements "which prevent anything from going wrong.....
[T]hese agreements call for the most stringent regulation of expendi-
tures that I know anything of."299 This may be true but was not respon-
sive to Moffat's point unless it is assumed that the interest of the
bondholders is identical with the interest of the government.
Following Moses's statement, Governor Alfred E. Smith queried
Moffat as to why his policy should not be left to future legislatures
to be decided as different situations arose. 0 0 Moffat replied:
I think the State has got to set up [in the constitution] certain poli-
cies as to what sort of government it is going to set up, how it is
going to operate, and what basic financial principles it is going to
approve... [and] before we go further in this authority field and
this development, which is now entirely unregulated .... we ought
to put these brakes in the Constitution for control in the future.301
Governor Smith was unpersuaded and noted that the proper title
for the Moffat proposal would be: "An amendment to the Constitution
to paralyze the one method we have discovered of getting work done
expeditiously and without overtaxing our people to get it done." 302
Governor Smith stated that he believed the authority method to be a
success and that any salutary feature in the Moffat proposal ("if there
is any, and I doubt it") could be taken care of by the legislature and
should not be in the constitution. 80 3
299 Id. at 2266.
300 Id. at 2267.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 2268.
One supposed advantage of an authority-avoiding taxation-seems ephemeral.
Nothing prevents a city from selling bonds, building a bridge, and collecting tolls to pay
off the bonds. As a self-supporting project, the bonds would be excluded from the city's
debt limit. A toll or fee, however, is a form of taxation, the taxation of a particular
class; its effect is to shift the tax burden from the general public to those obliged to use
the facility. Consequently, when an authority is given the power to collect tolls, it is given
the power to tax.
Imposition of heavy tolls might be part of a reasonable city policy to discourage the
use of automobiles. In this instance, the taxing power could be used to achieve a non-
fiscal purpose. If authorities control the bridges and tunnels, the city is powerless; the
authority and its bondholders desire only that amount of revenue that will not discourage
the use of their facilities and have no interest in the city's policy. Or, a city might desire
to use the revenues from a profitable bridge operation for an improved mass transit
system. Again, if an authority controls the bridge, the city is powerless to do so. Nor is
it likely to be able to persuade the authority to contribute to such improvements. The
authority and its bondholders have a vested interest in increasing automobile traffic and
suppressing competitive means of transportation.
303 Id. at 2270.
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Governor Smith moved to strike out the title of the amendment,80 4
which would, in effect, kill the Moffat proposal. The Convention voted
sixty-seven to sixty-two in favor of the Smith motion,30 5 but since a
two-thirds vote was required the motion was lost. Nonetheless, the
proposal required a favorable majority vote to advance to a third
reading,306 and it appeared to be doomed. Debate continued.
A Mr. Johnson noted that he was cautious about any provision
"that propose[d] to register a distrust of the Legislature.8 0 7 He asked
those who supported the measure why a constitutional provision was
required. Mr. George R. Fearon, Chairman of the Committee on the
Legislature and Its Powers,308 sought to explain its necessity. He noted
first that the Moffat proposal had been reported by his committee
following a "substantially unanimous vote,"30 9 and then he focused on
the problem of implied state liability and the Williamsburgh case. His
statement is quoted at some length because it seems to have been deci-
sive in persuading the Convention to adopt the Moffat amendment:
The people of the State have consistently limited the power of the
Legislature with respect to the pledging of the credit of the State
and yet under these authorities up to date there has been a very
serious question as to whether or not the full faith and credit of the
State of New York is not back of the bonds of those authorities,
because [of the Williamsburgh holding] ....
...You know now why the bond attorneys are against it.
They want the full faith and credit of the State of New York back
of these bonds before they take or underwrite them. They want a
distinct understanding that the full faith and credit of the State is
back of it. They are trying to get something for nothing-
At this point Moses requested Fearon to yield the floor to him.
Fearon declined. He continued:
And [the bond attorneys] are against this amendment, because
somebody had the nerve, Mr. Moffat had the nerve to stand up
here and say, when you buy these bonds, that the legislative act says
that the full faith and credit is not back of them. That is exactly
what it means.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 2272.
306 The Convention rules required that an amendment be read to the Convention
three times before a vote could be had on its adoption. Rule 36 of the 1938 Constitutional
Convention, in JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK,
1938, App. 2, at 9 (1938).
307 III 1938 REv ED R.coRw 2273.
808 I id. at 44.
809 III id. at 2274.
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This comes right down to the question of whether or not you
are going to protect the credit of the State, whether you are going
to protect the credit of the municipal subdivisions of the State, or
whether you are going to give these authorities an absolutely wide
open hand and let them go out and spend money in any manner
in which they please, issue bonds to any extent to which they can
get those bond attorneys to pass them and these underwriting con-
cerns to take them, because they are relying on the proposition that
if the revenues of the enterprise are not sufficient to meet the in-
terest and amortization, they can always go to the Legislature and
ask for an enabling act and get the Legislature to say in effect that
the full faith and credit of the State is in back of it.
I believe that when people buy these bonds they should know
definitely and certainly that the credit of the State of New York
and that the credit of the municipality is not behind those bonds.
There should not be any question about it.... If they want to buy
them under those circumstances, well and good, but let us not have
them buy those bonds and then come back to the Legislature and
say: "Well, there has been a precedent established in this State
under the Williamsburg[h] case. You did it in the Williamsburg[h]
case, and have got to do it for us. You have got to bail us out.18 10
Robert Moses's reaction to the Fearon speech was surprisingly
legalistic. He asserted that Williamsburgh was "not a case in point...
it is a case on taxation,"311 and further, that the case involved an agency,
which was not "analogous to an authority.., in the slightest degree." 312
Mr. Fearon stated that he thought the same legal principle was appli-
cable.313 Moses disagreed, stating that Williamsburgh was a "totally
different thing-and the court was actuated by a different motive and
you know it. '314 It is curious that Moses's approach was to distinguish
Williamsburgh on legal grounds. He did not meet the thrust of the
Fearon position-that the state or city should not be liable for the
bonds of an authority.
310 Id. at 2274-76.
311 Id. at 2278.
312 Id. at 2279.
313 Id. Mr. Fearon noted that he believed his legal opinion to be as good as Mr.
Moses's. He stated: "I do not know anything about building bridges. I will place my
guess as to what the law is against yours and make it an even 50-50 bet." Id.
The reasoning of Williansburgh seems equally applicable to an authority. It will be
recalled that the court there emphasized the state involvement in the project and con-
cluded that the bonds were "in essence and equity" the state's. In fact, although not
discussed on the Convention floor, the Court of Claims had already applied Williams-
burgh to an authority. Brockway v. State, 158 Misc. 424, 285 N.YS. 778 (Ct. Cl. 196).
314 III 1938 REvism REcoiw 2279.
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Mr. Morris Tremaine, the State Comptroller, spoke in agreement
with Fearon:
I personally believe every one of these authorities that is
created under legislative act will be paid for by this State and by
the existing Legislature at the time such a claim may be made.
... There are a number of them being created now of doubt-
ful earning power, and that is the particular reason why I am for
Mr. Moffat's amendment.815
Following the Comptroller's statement the Convention voted to
advance the Moffat amendment to a third reading by a vote of eighty
to sixty.316 On the third reading, one week later, the amendment, with
minor changes, was adopted by a vote of 141 to 1.31. Robert Moses,
gracefully bowing to the inevitable, supported the measure on its third
reading.3 18 On November 8, 1938, the people ratified the amendment,
along with other provisions, by a vote of 1,521,036 to 1,301,797.319 The
315 Id. at 2280-81. The same point had been raised earlier by Mr. Fearon in a
colloquy with Mr. Livingston:
Mr. Livingston: ... [D]o you think if [the Henry Hudson Authority] did
not meet its obligations that the State could be held responsible for those debts?
Mr. Fearon: Why, I have not any doubt, Senator, and I think you will agree
with me as a practical proposition, that if there was any danger of default in
interest on those obligations there would be a bill brought up here in the Legisla-
ture. Now, it might not be direct appropriation, but you and I have been up
here a long time. There would be a certain number of employees taken off.
There would be a lot of-you know. I do not need to tell you how it would be
done, because you know how it would be done.
Mr. Livingston: You and I would not be affected by that lobbying, would
we? (Laughter.)
Mr. Fearon: Because you and I were not on the Finance Committee.
Id. at 2278.
316 Id. at 2282, 2291.
317 IV id. at 2706.
318 Id. at 2705.
319 LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 329.
In its dosing moments, the Convention adopted a resolution calling for the publica-
tion of 25,000 copies of the proposed constitution to be made available to the public.
IV 1938 REvsSED REcoRD 3517-18. This version was to italicize new matter, bracket
material to be deleted, and add marginal notes as to the source of new matter. Id. The
marginal note with respect to Article X, § 5, stated: "New section added by Intro. 356,
Pr. 869 [Moffat] and Intro. 596, Pr. 872 [Halpern] and amended, combined and numbered
by Revision Com." JOURNAL OF THE CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, 1938, App. 3, Doc. No. 16, at 108 (1938). However, a typographical error had oc-
curred in the last version of the Moffat proposal, Pr. 869. The error was the dropping of
the word "except" from the sentence providing that no public corporation "shall here-
after be created except by special act of the legislature." III PROPOosF. AMENDMENTS OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRK, 1938, Int. 356, Pr. 375, 772,
824, 850, 869, at 2 (1938). With the word "except" dropped, the effect of the provision
would be to require creation pursuant to general law, the opposite of the result intended.
[Vol. 56:521
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AUTHORITIES
Moffat amendment, Article X, section 5, of the State Constitution, be-
came effective on January 1, 1989.320
Following the advancement of the Moffat amendment, the Conven-
tion took up the Halpern proposal. Halpern's proposal was far more
limited and less controversial than Moffat's. Its essential purpose was
to overrule constitutionally the Zimmermann case; 321 the Buffalo Sewer
Authority, upheld in the Zimmermann case, had, according to Halpern,
accomplished "an evasion of both the debt limit and the tax limit of the
city."3 22 Governor Smith, who moved to kill the Moffat amendment,
spoke in favor of the idea behind the Halpern proposal.3 23 Robert
Moses made no defense of the Zimmermann case, but argued that the
Article X, as read to the Convention and adopted by it, contained the correct provision.
IV 1938 RvisED REcoRD 3452, 3468. Similarly, the Address of the Delegates to the People
of the State contained a correct summary of the provision. The Address, 20,000 copies
of which were printed, stated:
Independent public authorities for the operation of public projects may be
created only by special act of the Legislature. Neither the State nor any political
subdivision shall be liable for their debts, although the Legislature may authorize
the taking over of the property and obligations of an authority. Their accounts
shall be subject to the supervision of the State or a city comptroller.
Id. at 3514.
320 N.Y. CoNsr. art. XX, § 1.
321 As Halpem explained: "The purpose of this proposal is to prevent the recurrence
in any cities of the experience of the City of Buffalo." III 1938 REvisED RECORD 2283.
322 Id. The Authority borrowed $15,000,000, which would have exceeded the city's
debt limit, for a sewer improvement. Id. It then financed its operations by charging a
"sewer rental," which Halpern considered a "new type of real property tax." Id.
Tax limits have been imposed upon cities since a constitutional amendment of 1884.
TAXATION & FINANCE 231. A tax limit is a restriction upon the amount of real property
tax which may be levied. Presently, for example, real estate taxes in New York City may
not exceed 2.5% of the average full valuation of taxable real estate in the city. N.Y.
CONsT. art. VIII, § 10. The 1938 constitution originated the idea that valuation be aver-
aged over five years rather than determined on a current basis. The committees explained
that the purpose was to avoid rapid fluctuations in permissible limits. Report of the
Committees on State Finances and Revenues, Cities, Counties and Towns, and Villages,
in JOURNAL oF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEw YoRu, 1938, App.
3, Doc. No. 6, at 8 (1938). A parallel provision was inserted into the debt limit provisions.
N.Y. CONsr. art. VIII, §§ 4, 10. The committees noted that averaging would be helpful
since,
in times of depression, when borrowing is least objectionable, the ability to
borrow is not reduced too drastically and, in times of rising values, when borrow-
ing should be curbed, there may be a lag in the expansion of the borrowing
capacity of the community.
Report of the Committees on State Finances and Revenues, Cities, Counties and Towns,
and Villages, supra at 6.
Taxes required to pay debt service on city debt were excluded from the tax limit.
N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10. For a good discussion of the benefits and detriments of tax
limits, see TAXATioN & FINANCE 231-66.
323 III 1938 REvisED RECORD 2287-88.
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Halpern language was so broad that it would interfere with the opera-
tion of legitimate authorities.3
24
Governor Smith, Senator Wagner, and Mr. Moses raised technical
objections to the Halpern proposal, as drafted, fearful that it might
affect authorities in no way similar to the Buffalo Sewer Authority.3 25
Halpern stated that this was unintentional and the proposal was laid
aside for amendment.3 26 Three days later, after language modifications,
the Convention advanced the proposal to a third reading. 27 On August
19, the Convention adopted the proposal by a vote of 146 to 1.328 The
Halpern amendment, as the second paragraph of Article X, section 5,
was ratified by the people on November 8, 1938.
The constitution of 1846 prohibited the gift or loan of the state's
credit to "any individual, association or corporation."3 29 In 1874
Article VIII, section 10, was added to the constitution by amendment.830
This section prohibited the gift or loan of the state's credit or money
to any "association, corporation, or private undertaking."331 Also in
1874, Article VIII, section 11, was ratified, prohibiting gifts and loans
324 Moses Memorandum II, at 5. Moses also took the position that the constitution
should not be burdened with specific prohibitions "against the recurrence of something
which Mr. Halpern does not like in his home city." Id.
325 III 1938 REvIsED REcoRD 2284-90.
No one at the Convention defended the Zimmermann holding. Governor Smith
described the Buffalo situation as follows:
So they set up a public authority, and the public authority is to get its
money by taxation. That is as near an evasion of the Constitution as anything
could be in the known world, and there is as much difference between that and
a self-liquidating project as there is between night and day.
Id. at 2288.
326 Id. at 2292.
327 Id. at 2521-22.
328 IV id. at 3246-47.
329 N.Y. CoNST. art. VII, § 9 (1846). Except for punctuation changes, this provision
remained in its original form until 1938.
330 N.Y. STATE CONsTrruTIoNAL CONVENTION COMM., REPORT: NEW YoRx STATE
CONsTITuTION ANNOTATED pt. II, at 92 (1938).
331 Id. The draftsmen did not wish to endanger the original 1846 provision. Con-
sequently the 1874 amendment created a new section (N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10 (1874)),
leaving the original section unaltered. As a result, the two sections were somewhat duplica-
tive. This duplication was eliminated by the 1938 constitution. N.Y. CONsT. art. VII, § 8.
The 1874 amendment created express exceptions to its general prohibition. It provided
that the prohibition shall not prevent the legislature from making provision for the
education and support of the blind, the deaf, the dumb, and juvenile delinquents. It
further excluded from the prohibition any fund or property held by the state for educa-
tional purposes.
332 N.Y. STATE CONSTrrTIONAL CONVENTION Commar., supra note 330. The local
prohibition of a gift or loan of "property" is not expressly paralleled in the state pro-
vision.
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of money, property, 32 or credit by cities and other local governments33
to "any individual, association, or corporation. '334
The state prohibition on the gift of credit preceded, and had
greater significance than, the prohibition on the gift of money. The
reasons are understandable. A gift of money is non-repetitive and defi-
nite; a gift of credit may cover a long period of time and is generally
uncertain. The railroads, prior to 1846, had falsely assured the state
that their revenues would be sufficient to meet debt service and that
the state's guarantee would never be needed. Also, as a function of de-
ferring payment, a gift of credit is likely to involve greater amounts
than an outright money gift.33 5
This type of reasoning was in evidence at the 1938 Convention.
The Finance Committee observed that the "State frequently gives its
money to authorities" and appropriates funds in aid of municipal
corporations. 330 This was obviously permissible. 337 But, on the other
hand, with respect to gifts or loans of credit, the prohibition must apply
to all corporations, public or private;338 otherwise, the Committee
333 Id.
334 Id. It expressly provided that the prohibition shall not prevent a city from
making provision for "its poor." Id.
335 The Court of Appeals has expressed this idea as follows:
[G]reat expenditures may be lightly authorized if payment is postponed. To
place the burden upon our children is easy. Nor do we scrutinize so closely the
expenditures to be made if that be done. We all recognize this tendency in pri-
vate life. We incur a future obligation cheerfully, where we would hesitate had
we to pay the cash. It is true in public matters. The pressure which will come
when the obligation matures is ignored. Conscious of this human weakness, to
guard against public bankruptcy. the people thought it wise to limit the legisla-
tive power.
People v. Westchester County Natl Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 474-75, 132 N.E. 241, 244 (1921).
336 Report of the Committee on State Finances and Revenues, in JOuRNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEw YoRK, 1938, App. 3, Doc. No. 3, at 5
(1938). In a case involving a possible gift of money, the Court of Appeals observed that
"[t]he word 'corporation' there used plainly refers to private and business corporations,
and does not include governmental agencies such as counties or towns." Board of Super-
visors v. State, 153 N.Y. 279, 293-94, 47 N.E. 288, 292 (1897).
337 To clarify the existing provision, the Committee inserted the adjective "private"
before the nouns "association" and "corporation." Report of the Committee on State
Finances and Revenues, supra note 336. The Committee proposal was adopted and the
constitution now prohibits gifts or loans of state money to, or in aid of "any private
corporation or association, or private undertaking." N.Y. CONsT. art. VII, § 8(l). Unlike
the local provision (id. art. VIII, § 1), the word "individual" is not used. However, its
absence is not believed significant because the phrase "private undertaking" is broad
enough to cover that situation.
338 Report of the Committee on State Finances and Revenues, supra note 36. The
Committee believed that it was restating existing law in this regard. Id. Governor Lehman
had taken the same position in his Annual Message to the Legislature of January 6, 1937,
when he stated: "Under the Constitution of the State of New York, no loans can be made
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noted, "an authority ... unable to sell its securities ... could rush to
the State for assistance." 3 9 An amendment to this effect was adopted
by the Convention and subsequently approved by the people.3 40
Still another attack on the authority structure came from the
Committee on Taxation. Typically, an authority requires that both
its property and income and the interest on its bonds be tax exempt. It
is also of extreme importance to an authority and its bondholders that
the various tax exemptions be irrepealable. An investment premised
upon tax exemptions might lose its attractions if the exemption could
be repealed by a subsequent legislature. Prior to the 1938 constitution,
it was believed lawful for the legislature to grant tax exemption by
irrepealable law.341 To take advantage of this belief, the Triborough
Bridge and Tunnel Authority Act was amended in 1937342 to provide
that the Authority "will be performing an essential governmental
function" and the "state of New York covenants with the holders of
the bonds" (1) that the authority will be required to pay no taxes on
its property and income, and (2) that the interest on the Authority's
bonds "shall at all times be exempt from taxation."3 43
The Committee on Taxation sought to prohibit legislation of
this type by imposing two conditions on the grant of tax exemption.
First, it provided that "[e]xemptions from taxation may be granted only
by general laws." 344 In other words, exemptions are not to be subject
by the State to municipal housing authorities for low-cost housing." PuBLIc PAPMZS OF
GovERNOR HERBERT H. LEHMAN-1937, at 34 (1940). The Committee, however, added that
"even were this not the correct interpretation of the existing language, the committee
believes that this is the limitation which should prevail." Report of the Committee on
State Finances and Revenues, supra note 336, at 6. To accomplish its purpose, the Com-
mittee drafted the language of the present constitution which provides "nor shall the
credit of the state be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual, or public or private
corporation or association, or private undertaking .... N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8(1).
339 Report of the Committee on State Finances and Revenues, supra note 336, at 6.
340 It will be evident to the reader that the prohibition of gifts or loans of credit
to public corporations covers much the same ground as the previously discussed Moffat
amendment. The draftsmen, however, had no assurance that either provision would be
adopted by the Convention. In fact, both were.
341 Moffat, a member of the Committee on Taxation (JOuRNAL OF THE CONsTrrrTIoNAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1938, at 24 (1938)), explained as follows:
We have had experience in this State in the past, the best example being the
property where the Chrysler Building is now located, where the Legislature gave
an exemption and which now the State is powerless to change even though it
is obvious that under economic conditions, as they now exist, that property
should not be .. . exempt.
II 1938 REvisED RcoRD 1127.
342 Act of Jan. 27, 1937, ch. 3, [1937] N.Y. Laws 2.
343 N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAw § 566 (McKinney 1970).
344 Report of the Committee on Taxation, in JoURNAL OF THE CONSrrrUTIONAL CON-
vENTION OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK, 1938, App. 3, Doc. No. 2, at 1 (1938). This provision
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to separate negotiation in a special act; they may be granted only by
general laws that will treat equally all persons similarly situated.
Second, the Committee provided that all exemptions granted "may be
altered or repealed."3 45
The prohibition of irrepealable exemptions was discussed on the
Convention floor by Moffat who described the Committee's delibera-
tions:
The question came up whether the Legislature should have
the power to give an exemption, we will say, to new housing as was
done in 1922 for a period of ten years, and guarantee a contract
exemption. It was felt that if the Legislature might make a contract
for ten years, they might equally make a contract for exemption in
perpetuity. And it was felt that it was sounder to say that the Legis-
lature might not contract, give an exemption by contract, which
they might not later alter.3 46
The tax article prepared by the Committee on Taxation was ratified
by the people as Article XVI of the 1938 constitution.
In sum, the 1938 constitution determined that neither state nor
local credit could be used in aid of an authority. This was prohibited
both by the Moffat amendment (Article X, section 5) and the gift and
loan provisions (Article VII, section 8, and Article VIII, section 1). The
constitution further determined that tax exemptions, except for reli-
gious, educational, and charitable purposes, were to be repealable.
(Article XVI).347
is now found in N.Y. CONsr. art. XVI, § 1 (2d ). This language clarified an existing
constitutional provision. See note 348 infra. It also made clear that the general law
requirement applied to public authorities.
345 Report of the Committee on Taxation, supra note 344. This provision expressly
excepted exemptions for religious, educational, or charitable purposes. Id.
Mr. Martin Saxe of New York was Chairman of the Committee on Taxation at both
the 1915 and 1938 Conventions. In 1915 Saxe attempted to include the following lan-
guage in the tax article: "Laws granting exemptions from taxation, whether heretofore or
hereafter enacted, shall be subject to modification or repeal." 1915 REcoan 955. This
provision was objected to by General Wickerslbam, who doubted the wisdom of a "clause
which would attempt to repeal contracts, solemnly made by the State." Id. at 957. The
provision was not included in the 1915 proposed constitution. Id. at 3038. In 1938 Saxe
succeeded in adding to the constitution the language quoted in the text.
346 II 1938 REvIsED REcoRD 1127. N.Y. CoNsr. art. XVI, § 1, provides that "[t]he
power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended or contracted away, except as to
securities issued for public purposes ...." Assuming authority bonds to be such securities,
it would therefore be permissible to provide, by general law, that the interest on authority
bonds shall be tax exempt. But such a law could not be irrepealable. Moffat explained
that the language, "'Exemptions may be altered or repealed,' is a clarification tied up
with the words 'contracted away.'" II 1938 RvisE REcoRD 1127.
347 It is probably fair to say that the authority system cannot survive under such
restraints. However, as of March 31, 1970, the Comptroller reported an outstanding
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DEVELOPMENTS: 1939-1960
Despite the provisions inserted into the constitution by the 1938
Convention, authorities subsequently created continued to be granted
tax exemption by special act.348 In 1939 and 1940, immediately follow-
ing adoption of the constitution, many authorities had their statutes
amended to create a "tax contract" between their bondholders and
the state.349 For example, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Author-
authority debt of $6.5 billion which is more than two and a half times greater than out-
standing state debt. N.Y. DEP'T OF AUDIT & CONTROL, 1970 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMP-
TROLLER 2 (1970). His report further noted that total authority assets approximated $10
billion, an increase of 500% in just four years. Id. at 22. Finally, the report shows that
authority gross revenues were almost $155 million greater than state sales tax receipts.
Id. at 2, 9. It may be asked, why, in light of the constitutional restraints, is there out-
standing in New York today some $6.5 billion of authority debt? The answer is simple-
the constitution has been ignored.
Clearly, the impact of the 1938 constitution is not noticeable in the following statement
of Mr. Brenton Harries, Vice President of Standard & Poor's Corporation. Mr. Harries's
statement was in explanation of why Standard & Poor's had rated the bonds of the Urban
Development Corporation, a public corporation, as "AA," only one notch below the
state's "AAA" rating. Mr. Harries stated:
"[O]ur rating on U.D.C. ... depends upon our rating on New York State ....
[I]n our judgment, the legislative intent and commitment . . . is to in-
sure the timely repayment of U.D.C.'s bond principal and interest when due."
N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1971, at 47, col. 4.
848 Authorities in existence at the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1938
were exempted from taxation pursuant to the provisions of the special acts that created
them. E.g., Act of April 17, 1933, ch. 145, § 13, [1933] N.Y. Laws 542 (Triborough Bridge
and Tunnel Authority); Act of March 20, 1933, ch. 70, § 9, [1933] N.Y. Laws 110 (Jones
Beach State Parkway Authority); Act of March 17, 1933, ch. 67, § 12, [1933] N.Y. Laws 96
(New York State Bridge Authority). These exemptions may have been unlawful when
enacted. N.Y. CONSr. art. III, § 18 (1894), established a number of categories with respect
to which the "Legislature shall not pass a private or local bill." Instead, the "Legislature
shall pass general laws providing for the cases enumerated in this section." In 1901 the
constitution was amended to add a new category of cases to this section-any law
"[g]ranting to any person, association, firm or corporation, an exemption from taxation
on real or personal property." N.Y. CONsr. art. III, § 18 (1901). The state's policy against
special tax exemptions had already been statutorily established in the General Tax Law
of 1896, ch. 908, [1896] N.Y. Laws 795. See People ex rel. Roosevelt Hosp. v. Raymond,
126 App. Div. 720, 111 N.Y.S. 177 (1st Dep't 1908). It might have been argued that the
constitutional phrase "corporations" did not include public corporations such as authori-
ties. The 1938 constitution removed any question by providing that tax exemptions "may
be granted only by general laws." N.Y. CONsT. art. XVI, § 1.
349 E.g., Act of June 15, 1939, ch. 874, § 14, [1939] N.Y. Laws 2452 (Triborough
Bridge and Tunnel Authority); Act of June 16, 1939, ch. 891, § 12, [1939] N.Y. Laws 2938
(Jones Beach State Parkway Authority); Act of April 25, 1940, ch. 764, § 5, [1940] N.Y.
Laws 1989 (New York State Bridge Authority). Examples of "tax contract" provisions for
authorities created subsequent to 1940 include N.Y. Panv. Hous. FIN. Izw § 54 (McKinney
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ity statute was amended to provide that the state "covenants with the
purchasers and with all subsequent holders" of the Authority's bonds
that "in consideration of the acceptance of any payment for the bonds"
they "shall at all times be free from taxation."350 These "tax contracts"
attempt an irrepealable grant of tax exemption. They represent a pecu-
liar effort to bring their tax exemption within the protection of the
Federal Constitution's impairment of contracts clause.351
In a legal sense, this effort fails because no valid contract can be
entered into in violation of the state constitution, and the "tax con-
tract" device violates three constitutional provisions: (1) it is created
by special act, not general law;352 (2) it purports to be an irrepealable
tax exemption; 353 and (3) it purports to be irrepealable even though
the constitution contains an anti-Dartmouth College provision that
all laws governing corporations "may be altered from time to time or
repealed."3 54 The "tax contract" effort, therefore, merely resulted in
burdening the statutes of the state with a large number of unconstitu-
tional provisions.
In 1939 the constitutional prohibition on the gift or loan of a
local government's credit to a public corporation first came before
the courts in Union Free School District v. Town of Rye. 355 The West-
chester County Tax Law, enacted in 1916 351 required that the town
collect school taxes in an amount determined by the school district
officials. This tax collection procedure was contrary to the practice in
the rest of the state, where the county collected taxes on behalf of
school districts and towns. The Westchester County statute directed
the town to pay over the full amount of taxes required to be col-
lected.257 If any taxes were uncollected, the town was directed to borrow
money to meet the deficiency arising from such unpaid taxes.3538 After
the town paid such deficiency, the statute provided that any payment
Supp. 1970) (Housing Finance Agency); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6272 (McKinney Supp. 1970)
(Urban Development Corporation).
350 N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW § 566-a (McKinney 1970).
351 U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10. See generally CONsrrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANALY-
s's AND INTERPRETATION (6th ed.), S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 378-400 (1964).
352 N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
353 Id. Authorities do not come within the constitutional exceptions for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes.
354 Id. art. X, § 1.
355 256 App. Div. 456, 10 N.Y.S.2d 333 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 469, 21 N.E2d 681
(1939).
356 Act of March 31, 1916, ch. 105, [1916] N.Y. Laws 228.
s87 Id. § 24, [1916] N.Y. Laws 285.
s58 Id. § 31, [1916] N.Y. Laws 239.
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of the taxes "shall belong to the town." 69 Upon collection, such
amounts were to be applied to reduce the town's indebtedness.360 The
town was therefore both a collecting agency for, and a guarantor of, the
school taxes. But even in its capacity as guarantor it would suffer no
loss if it could eventually collect the unpaid taxes.
The case arose when the town of Rye refused to borrow money to
pay an unpaid tax deficiency. The town argued that the 1988 constitu-
tion, prohibiting gifts of credit to public corporations, made the statu-
tory scheme illegal; that is, the constitution prohibited the gift of the
town's credit in aid of a public corporation-the school district. The
constitution, after the 1938 changes, permitted counties, but not towns,
to borrow to meet a deficiency in the taxes they were required to collect
on behalf of school districts or towns.361 The appellate division held
that a school district was not a "public corporation" within the meaning
of the constitution but was instead a civil division of the state. The
court believed that the constitution intended the prohibition to apply
to public benefit corporations "of which the Triborough Bridge Author-
ity is typical." 3 2 The proviso clause, which clearly assumed that school
districts were public corporations, was inserted, according to the court,
"as a matter of excessive caution.31 63
The Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's narrow interpreta-
tion and held that school districts were public corporations. Nonethe-
less, the court upheld the validity of the statute requiring the town to
borrow and pay over the funds to a public corporation. It did so by
reaching the conclusion that the borrowing was in aid of the town of
Rye, not the school district. The court reasoned that the constitution
does not restrict the power of the legislature to apportion the duties
of government among governmental entities. It may delegate to one
entity the duty to educate and to another the responsibility for col-
359 Id. § 24, [1916] N.Y. Laws 235.
360 Id. § 31, [1916] N.Y. Laws 239.
361 [N]or shall any . . . town . . . give or loan its credit to or in aid of any
individual, or public or private corporation or association, or private undertaking
.... This provision shall not prevent a county from contracting indebtedness for
the purpose of advancing to a town or school district, pursuant to law, the
amount of unpaid taxes returned to it.
N.Y. CONsr. art. VIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
The express exclusion of counties from the state's general tax collection system
could lead to the implication that the Convention would have excluded the Westchester
reverse tax collection system if it had been called to its attention. This is not a good rule
of constitutional construction but it seemed to influence the courts. See text accompany-
ing note 368 infra.
362 256 App. Div. at 458, 10 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
803 Id. at 457, 10 N.Y.S.2d at 35. . .
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lecting taxes. Further, it may make the tax-collecting entity a guarantor
of any tax deficiencies. 64 Consequently, when a town borrowed for
such a purpose, it did so to "meet its own obligations in aid of a govern-
mental duty"365 properly imposed upon it by the legislature. The
court's reasoning is unpersuasive. It fails at its starting point-the
proposition that the constitution does not restrict the power of the
legislature to apportion governmental duties among governmental
entities. The gift and loan provisions do exactly that.
The court was plainly influenced by the long-standing use of the
tax collecting system and the absence of a clear constitutional intent
to alter it,360 observing that overturning the statute would "disrupt
our system of taxation." 367 Finally, the court noted:
We cannot reasonably read into the constitutional provision an
intent to prohibit the continuance of such a system because a saving
clause has been added intended to preserve a similar taxing system
in effect in the other fifty-six counties of the State .... s68
A possible way to look at the Union Free School District case is to
say that no gift was involved since the town received consideration:
i.e., educational services. It is, of course, true that the gift and loan
provisions do not prevent a city from purchasing for value goods and
services. It is not a gift to the railroad if the city buys a railroad ticket
to send an official to Washington on city business. But the value of the
goods or services purchased must be ascertainable; if the value of the
consideration cannot be known, it is impossible to determine that a
gift has not been made. In the pre-1874 railroad cases, the town, in at
least some instances, received value by inducing the railroad to come
through the town.3 69 It was, however, value of an unascertainable sort
and the constitution was amended to prohibit such transactions.
In one case, Comereski v. Elmira,870 Union Free School District
has been relied on in a situation having nothing to do with the system
864 The propriety of this system had been upheld in a pre-1938 constitution case,
Town of Amherst v. County of Erie, 260 N.Y. 361, 183 N.E. 851 (1933).
865 Union Free School Dist. v. Town of Rye, 280 N.Y. 469, 481, 21 N.E2d 681, 686
(1939).
366 See HI 1938 Rmvsm Rxcopm 2520-21.
367 280 N.Y. at 478, 21 N.E.2d at 685.
868 Id. at 480, 21 N.E2d at 686. Generally, later cases have viewed Union Free School
District as holding only that one political subdivision may collect taxes on behalf of an-
other and may guarantee the payment of unpaid taxes. See County of Oneida v.'City of
Utica, 260 App. Div. 363, 22 N.Y.S.2d 642 (4th Dep't 1940), aff'd mem., 285 N.Y. 788, 35
N.E.2d 189 (1941); Union Free School Dist. v. County of Steuben, 178 Misc. 415, 33
N.YS.2d 854 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
369 See II 1867-68 DEBATES 1141; 1I id. at 1997-99, 2014-15.
370 808 N.Y. 248, 125 N.E.2d 241 (1955).
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of collecting taxes. The Elmira Parking Authority was authorized to
develop and operate parking lots. The city of Elmira maintained
jurisdiction of parking meters on the city's streets. In connection with
a $500,000 Authority bond issue, the city and the Authority entered
into an agreement with respect to the city's parking meter revenues.
The Authority was to give the city notice of any estimated deficit in
its operation and maintenance fund and its debt service fund. The city
agreed to pay over the amount of any estimated deficits, up to $25,000,
out of the net revenues of the parking meters. The agreement expressly
provided that it was for the benefit of Authority bondholders. In other
words, the city was to guarantee the Authority's bonds. The guarantee
was to be limited in amount and contingent upon funds being available,
but that in no way changed its nature. The agreement contained every-
thing that Moffat, Fearon, and the 1938 Convention had sought to
avoid. Not twenty years had passed and it was proposed to use govern-
mental credit to support authority debt.
Remarkably, the appellate division upheld the validity of this agree-
ment. More remarkably, the Court of Appeals upheld the appellate
division. The rationale of the decision is unacceptable: the constitution
clearly permits gifts of property and money by localities to public
corporations, and since a promise to make a payment of money in the
future is simply a promise to make a permitted gift in the future, the
agreement is valid.
The 1938 Convention-consistent with the state's constitutional
history-drew a sharp distinction between gifts of money and gifts of
credit. A gift of money will not burden future generations, and since
governments do not hold large surpluses, the amount of an outright
gift is not likely to be large. Furthermore, the size of a money gift is
restrained by public scrutiny. In a credit transaction, however, the
public is not apt to know what is going on. As Michael Hoffman told
the 1846 Convention: "It is silent, creeps along, gets into the State, and
when the act is once passed, the debt incurred, the obligation is as
strong as death for its payment." 371 The state's most serious evils had all
derived from the use of debt supported by state or local credit.
But the constitutional distinction has no value if the courts inter-
pret a promise to pay money in the future as not involving a city's
credit 372 This was pointed out by Judge Fuld in his dissenting opinion:
371 1846 DEBATEs 943.
372 The court relied on Union Free School District for this proposition, stating that it
"is flat authority that the city may do what the city is doing here." 308 N.Y. at 252, 125
N.E.2d at 243. However, Union Free School District is not based on such reasoning.
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It is quite evident that the contract provided, not for any gift or
loan of money or property on hand, but rather for a gift or loan of
the city's credit, for an obligation and purpose not its own. The
city's promise is, in essence, to make good, for an unspecified and
indeterminate period and out of funds not in existence, an indebt-
edness incurred by the Authority. The circumstance that that
promise is conditional in nature does not alter the fact that the
contract calls upon the city to answer for the default of another.
The vice of the arrangement is that it mortgages, for the use of
others, future general funds of the city which it would otherwise
have available for its own purposes, and opens the door to whole-
sale evasions of the applicable constitutional debt and taxing limi-
tations. It was just this sort of situation at which the constitutional
provision was directed. 373
A further curiosity in the Comereski decision is the absence of
any discussion of the Moffat amendment, Article X, section 5. That
section provides that no political subdivision of the state "shall at any
time be liable for the payment of any obligation issued by a public
corporation heretofore or hereafter created." The provision is not
mentioned by the court and apparently was not argued by the parties.
The great Moses-Moffat debates at the 1938 Convention and the result-
ing constitutional provision were therefore not available to the court.
In sum, between 1939 and 1960, some erosion of the 1938 Conven-
tion's work had occurred, in some instances with judicial sanction. But
the massive undermining still lay ahead.
VII
SUBVERTING THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION
The story begins with the passage, in 1955, of the Mitchell-Lama
law.374 This act was intended to provide housing for families earning
between $5,000 and $10,000-those somewhat above public housing
levels. 7 5 The law provided that government would grant low-interest
373 Id. at 257, 125 N.E.2d at 246 (emphasis in original).
374 Act of April 18, 1955, ch. 407, [1955] N.Y. Laws 1061.
375 The Mitchell-Lama program is discussed in Quirk & Wein, Homeownership for
the Poor: Tenant Condominiums, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968,
and the Rockefeller Program, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 811, 855-57 n.230 (1969). The program
was intended to produce housing that would rent for about $20 per room per month.
The constitution and statute require that the subsidized housing be provided only for
"families of low income." N.Y. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 1; N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 12(10),
31(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1970). Recently, the New York City Board of Estimate, pur-
suant to the city Mitchell-Lama program, has approved a rental project with estimated
rents of $76.74 per room per month. Tanya Towers, Inc., N.Y. City Bd. of Estimate,
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mortgage loans and tax exemptions to make possible new housing
within the means of such families.37 6 Section 2 of the law appropriated
$50,000,000 of a bond issue for the State Division of Housing to meet
the needs of the program.377 In conformity with the constitution's
referendum requirement, section 3 of the law provided that the
$50,000,000 appropriation "shall not take effect unless and until it
shall have been submitted to the people at a general election." The
people voted in favor of the initial funding of the Mitchell-Lama pro-
gram by a vote of 954,145 to 931,783.378 In 1956 a proposed bond issue
for an additional $100,000,000 was defeated by a vote of 1,586,297 to
1,220,186.M79 In 1958 the third and final referendum held with respect
to the Mitchell-Lama program approved a $100,000,000 bond issue by
a margin of 23,000 votes.880
This narrow margin and the defeat of the 1956 issue made it clear
that the Mitchell-Lama program had but a tenuous hold on the public
imagination. The dependence of funding upon "the vagaries of popular
mood"38' was not acceptable to the program's executive and legislative
proponents. Instead, they determined upon a scheme to evade the con-
stitution.
The Housing Finance Agency (HFA) statute was enacted in
1960.382 Its draftsmanship is generally attributed to John Mitchell,
currently the Attorney General of the United States. 33 As of 1970 about
$1,900,000,000 worth of bonds had been issued pursuant to it.3s4 More-
Calendar No. 95, Project Plan Summary, at I1 (Feb. 13, 1970). A family with three or more
dependents is eligible for a unit if the family's income does not exceed seven times the
unit's rental. N.Y. Piuv. Hous. FIN. LAw § 31(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1970). Thus, assuming
a seven-room apartment at a rental of $76.74 per room, a family of four with an income
of $45,132.12 would be eligible for occupancy. It is not believed that any court will con-
sider such a family to be "low income" within the meaning of the constitution.
376 N.Y. Panv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 22-23, 83 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
377 A new bond issue was not necessary. The previous year, pursuant to Act of Feb.
13, 1954, ch. 15, [1954] N.Y. Laws 33, the people had authorized a $200,000,000 bond
issue for purposes of slum clearance and public housing. After a referendum, § 2 was to
authorize the diversion of $50,000,000 of this bond issue to the Mitchell-Lama program.
The 1954 public housing and slum clearance bond issue secured a plurality of 400,000
votes. TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, REPORT: HOUSING,
LABOR, NATURAL REsoURcs 116 (1967). The 1955 Mitchell-Lama referendum achieved a
plurality of 22,000 votes. Id.
378 TEMPORARY STATE COaMM'N ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 377.
379 Id.
880 The 1958 vote was 1,156,093 to 1,133,936. Id. at 117.
881 Reilly & Schulman, The State Urban Development Corporation: New York's
Innovation, 1 URBAN LAW. 129, 135 (1969).
882 Act of April 18, 1960, ch. 671, [1960] N.Y. Laws 1945.
383 Reilly & Schulman, supra note 381.
384 N.Y. DEPT oF AuDrr & CONTROL, supra note 347, at 24.
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over, it has served as a model for a number of other statutes, 85 and the
Comptroller has estimated that a total of some $6.5 billion of "non-
state debt" is outstanding in New York.380
The HFA statute characterizes the entity created by it as a "cor-
porate governmental agency constituting a public benefit corpora-
tion."3 87 The legislative history of the statute indicates that its drafters
385 N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 378 (McKinney 1969) (State University Construction Fund,
1962); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 6251-85 (McKinney Supp. 1970) (Urban Development
Corporation, 1968); id. §§ 7381-406 (New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation,
1969); id. §§ 4401-17 (Health and Mental Hygiene Facilities Improvement Corporation,
1968).
886 N.Y. Du'r OF Aunrr & CONTROL, supra note 347, at 22.
387 N.Y. Pray. Hous. FIN. LAw § 43 (McKinney Supp. 1970). This is a fairly typical
description of what is commonly known as an authority. The description, however, is
not helpful in determining the nature of an authority; it is better understood by ex-
amining its various attributes. The following are some of the characteristics generally
found in authorities: (1) freedom from local debt limit provisions (Gaynor v. Marohn,
268 N.Y. 417, 198 N.E. 13 (1935); Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740
(1935)); (2) freedom from local tax limit provisions (Gaynor v. Marohn, supra; Robertson
v. Zimmermann, supra); (3) freedom from referendum requirement for state debt (see,
e.g., III 1938 REvisED REcoRD 2259); (4) freedom from local real estate tax (Bush Terminal
Co. v. City of New York, 282 N.Y. 306, 26 N.E.2d 269 (1940)); (5) freedom from state
or local tax on interest of authority bonds (see, e.g., N.Y. PuB. ATH. LAw § 566 (Mc-
Kinney 1970) (Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority)); (6) freedom from federal
tax on interest of bonds (Commissioner v. White's Estate, 144 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1944);
Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944)); (7) freedom from federal
tax on operating profit (Commissioner v. White's Estate, supra; Commissioner v. Sham-
berg's Estate, supra); (8) authority bonds not considered "general obligations" of the
government within meaning of Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (Supp. V,
1970) (Port of New York Authority v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968));
(9) freedom from constitutional civil service requirements (Agesen v. Catherwood, 55
Misc. 2d 744, 750, 286 N.Y.S.2d 969, 975 (Sup. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 32 App.
Div. 2d 416, 303 N.Y.S.2d 987 (2d Dep't 1969)); (10) freedom from N.Y. LABOR LAw § 220
(McKinney Supp. 1970), requiring payment of prevailing rates of wage (Agesen v. Cather-
wood, 32 App. Div. 2d 416, 303 N.Y.S.2d 987 (2d Dep't 1969)); (11) freedom from municipal
regulation (Agesen v. Catherwood, 55 Misc. 2d 744, 748, 286 N.Y.S.2d 969, 973 (Sup. Ct.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 32 App. Div. 2d 416, 303 N.Y.S.2d 987 (2d Dep't 1969));
(12) freedom from emergency rent law (Port of New York Authority v. J.E. Linde Paper
Co., 205 Misc. 110, 127 N.Y.S.2d 155 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1953)); (13) freedom from suit
without consent on ground that authority has sovereign immunity (Howell v. Port of
New York Authority, 34 F. Supp. 797 (D.NJ. 1940); Benz v. New York State Thruway
Authority, 9 N.Y.2d 486, 174 N.E.2d 727, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1961), petition for cert. dis-
missed, 369 U.S. 147 (1962); see Dormitory Authority v. Span Elec. Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 114,
218 N.E.2d 693, 271 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1966)); (14) freedom from N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 135
(McKinney Supp. 1970), requiring separate specifications for contracts (Plumbing Ass'n
v. New York State Thruway Authority, 5 N.Y.2d 420, 158 N.E.2d 238, 185 N.Y.S.2d 534
(1959)); (15) freedom from N.Y. STATE FwN. LAw § 174 (McKinney Supp. 1970), requiring
that contracts be awarded to low bidder (Thompson Constr. Corp. v. Dormitory Author-
ity, 48 Misc. 2d 296, 264 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 1965)); (16) freedom from public dis-
closure of books and records (New. York Post Corp. v. Moses, 10 N.Y.2d 199, 176 N.E.2d
709, 219 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1961)); and (17) power to adopt traffic rules whose violation shall
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first contemplated having the state guarantee the mortgages in which
the HFA would invest.318 This idea was rejected, presumably because
of blatant unconstitutionality, and the following statutory pattern
evolved.
The statute provides that the "state does hereby pledge to and
agree with the holders of any notes or bonds" that (1) it "will not limit
or alter the rights hereby vested" in the HFA to fulfill the terms of
any bondholder agreement, and (2) it will not "in any way impair the
rights and remedies" of any bondholders.389 By its terms, the state's
pledge and agreement continue in force until the notes and bonds,
with interest, "are fully met and discharged." 390 The statute therefore
purports to be irrepealable until the bonds are paid off.
The anti-Dartmouth College provision of the state constitution
prohibits an undertaking of this kind. It provides that all laws creating
a public or private corporation "may be altered from time to time or
be a misdemeanor punishable in the state courts by fine or imprisonment (People v.
Malmud, 4 App. Div. 2d 86, 164 N.Y.S.2d 204 (2d Dep't 1957); N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW
§ 553(5) (McKinney 1970) (Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority)).
It is apparent, therefore, that the courts have been generally amenable to the
highly selective approach taken by the authorities. Authorities covet those governmental
attributes that are considered desirable, such as tax exemptions, immunity from suit,
and immunity from municipal regulation. Authorities deny those governmental attributes
that are considered undesirable, such as referendum requirements, local debt limits,
civil service provisions, multiple bidding, and public disclosure of books and records. The
resulting entity cannot be viewed as either governmental or nongovernmental; it is a
polyglot.
Some discussions of authorities are found in TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON COORDI-
NATION OF STATE ACTIVITIES, STAFF REPORT OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES UNDER NEW YORK STATE,
1956 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 46; Edelstein, The Authority Plan-Tool of Modern Government,
28 CORNELL L.Q. 177 (1943); Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical
Aspects, 47 YAI. L.J. 14 (1937); Netherton, Area-Development Authorities: A New Form
of Government by Proclamation, 8 VAND. L. REv. 678 (1955); Shestack, The Public Author-
ity, 105 U. PA. L. Rxv. 553 (1957); Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as
Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 177 (1937).
The Shestack article concludes that the authority "presents a departure from demo-
cratic traditions unwarranted by need or experience." Shestack, supra at 569.
388 The Governor's Report of Task Force on Middle Income Housing recommended
the creation of the HFA on this basis. The Report stated that "the indirect use of the
State's credit through the guarantee of the mortgages held by the Agency would not
involve an unduly burdensome contingent liability to support even as much as two billion
dollars of loan guarantees." NEw YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, 1960, at 278 (N.Y. Legis-
lative Service, Inc. 1960). Whether the obligation would be "unduly burdensome" or not,
such an undertaking by the state would be clearly unconstitutional in the absence of a
referendum. As has been seen, the avoidance of a referendum was the only purpose for
the creation of the HFA. The state-guaranteed mortgage would also violate the pro-
hibition on the gift or loan of state credit.
389 N.Y. PRuv. HoUs. FIN. LAw § 48 (McKinney 1962).
390 Id.
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repealed. '391 The constitutionally-reserved power cannot, of course, be
contracted away.
The HFA statute states that the Agency's "property" and "income"
shall be exempt from state and local taxes.392 The statute is a special
act since the constitution provides that no public corporation shall be
created "except by special act."393 But the constitution requires that
exemptions from taxation be granted "only by general laws." 394 The
exemption of HFA property and income is therefore invalid.395
The statute does not expressly provide that the exemption is to be
irrepealable, but the state agreement not to limit or alter vested rights
until the bonds are paid off has the effect of making the exemption
irrepealable until the bonds are redeemed. The constitution, however,
provides that all exemptions "may be altered or repealed" except those
granted for "religious, educational or charitable purposes. 3 98 The
constitution therefore prohibits, with the noted exceptions, an irrepeal-
able tax exemption. This result is further required because the exemp-
tion is contained in an act that creates a corporation, and according to
the constitution, such an act "may be altered from time to time or
repealed."3 97 Consequently, even if an exemption is originally valid,
the constitution provides that it is freely repealable.
391 N.Y. CONsT. art. X, § 1. It may be that, in the case of a public corporation
such as the HFA, the constitutional reservation is not necessary. Chief Justice Marshall
made it clear that the constitution "did not intend to restrain the States in the regulation
of their civil institutions." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 629 (1819). See Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879).
392 N.Y. Pmv. Hous. FIN. LAw § 53 (McKinney 1962).
393 N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 5.
394 Id. art. XVI, § 1.
395 As a practical matter, since the HFA is a financing agency, the exemption of its
property would not seem important. The question is of the utmost importance, how-
ever, when a large property-holding authority such as the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel
Authority is considered. Its exemption is based also on a special act. N.Y. PuB. AUTH.
LAW § 566 (McKinney 1970). Similarly, the tax exemption of the Urban Development
Corporation is based upon a special act. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6272 (McKinney Supp.
1970). N.Y. REA. PROP. TAx LAw § 412 (McKinney 1960) provides that the real property
owned by authorities enumerated in the Public Authorities Law "shall be entitled to
such exemption as may be provided therein." The section does not establish any stand-
ards. The Public Authorities Law is a series of special acts. The effect of § 412 is to
delegate to a special act the power to exempt that which can only be exempted by
general law. Section 412 could not, therefore, be considered a general law for purposes
of the constitution. Section 404 of the Real Property Tax Law exempts real property
"owned by the state of New York or any department or agency thereof." The provision
would not seem applicable to authorities that have successfully maintained in the courts
that they are separate and independent entities. But see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, 1953 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 68, at 205.
398 N.Y. CONsr. art. XVI, § 1.
397 Id. art. Y, § 1.
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The exemption of the interest on HFA bonds is the next problem.
The statute provides that the creation of HFA "is in all respects for the
benefit of the people" and that the agency "will be performing an es-
sential governmental function." 398 It continues, "[t]he state covenants
with the purchasers" of bonds "in consideration of the acceptance" and
payment for the bonds, that the interest thereon "shall at all times be
free from taxation."3 99 The provision is constitutionally invalid since,
as has been noted, any act creating a corporation "may be altered from
time to time or repealed."400 The Court of Appeals has held that tax
exemptions contained in charters are subject to the reserved power to
alter or repeal but that the exercise of such power must be direct and
will not be implied.40 1 Thus, any exemption validly granted with
respect to the interest on bonds may be repealed by the legislature.
The statute provides that the state may, upon furnishing funds,
require the agency to redeem "any issue of bonds."40 2 Creating a poten-
tial state liability is, of course, the essence of this "right" to redeem,
but the constitution provides that the state shall not at "any time be
liable for the payment of any obligations" issued by a public corpora-
tion.403 The constitution creates one exception to its general prohibi-
tion; the state may "acquire the properties of any such corporation and
pay the indebtedness thereof."40 4 In other words, the state may,"buy
out" an authority. The statute, however, does not provide for the termi-
398 N.Y. Psuv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 54 (McKinney 1962).
399 Id.
400 N.Y. CONsr. art. X, § 1. In a proper case, an interesting question may be pre-
sented. The first paragraph of Article XVI, § 1, provides that the power of taxation
shall never be surrendered or contracted away "except as to securities issued for public
purposes." This seems clearly to imply that the power of taxation could be contracted
away for public purposes. The second paragraph of Article XVI, § 1, provides that exemp-
tions may be granted only by general law and that all exemptions may be altered or re-
pealed. The two paragraphs are in apparent conflict. Three interpretations seem pos-
sible: (1) the first and second paragraphs are independent; if an exemption is granted
for securities issued for public purposes it need not be done by general law and it may
be irrepealable; (2) the second paragraph qualifies the authorization of the first; the
taxing power can be contracted away but it must be done by a general law and such
law will be repealable; or (3) the taxing power may be initially contracted away by
special act but such act must be repealable. See note 346 supra.
401 People ex rel. Cooper Union v. Sexton, 273 N.Y. 462, 6 N.E.2d 404 (1936) (Chrysler
Building Case); People ex rel. Roosevelt Hosp. v. Raymond, 194 N.Y. 189, 197, 87 N.E.
90, 93 (1909); see Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 194 N.Y.
212, 87 N.E. 443 (1909).
402 N.Y. Pa-v. Hous. FiN. LAW § 49 (McKinney 1962). This "right" may not be ex-
ercised until the bonds have been outstanding for 20 years. The state must pay '105%o
of face value and accrued interest unless the bond indenture provides otherwise.
403 N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 5.
404 Id.
[VoI. 56:521
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AUTHORITIES
nation of the HFA upon payment of its bonds or for the conveyance
of its property to the state; the state would therefore pay off the HFA
debt and receive nothing in return. Since the HFA "right" to redeem
provision does not come within the constitutional exception, it is in-
valid.40 5 Further, it is disingenuous to refer to a bail out as a "right."
The statute provides in unequivocal terms that the state shall
guarantee the debt of the HFA.406 The guarantee is not direct; rather,
it provides that if the HFA reserve for the payment of principal and
interest is insufficient then the HFA shall draw a "blank check" on the
state treasury and the needed amount !'shall be annually apportioned
and paid to the agency. 4%0 It requires "a peculiar mind to draw a dis-
tinction between a direct guarantee of the bonds and a guarantee of a
fund out of which the bonds will be paid. That, however, is the theory
of the statute. This guarantee or "blank check" provision is considered
the most important innovation in the HFA statute. It has been said
that this section transformed what would have been "speculative
securities into rated bonds." 408
It should not be disputed that a guarantee is a form of debt or
credit. The constitution, since 1846, has prohibited the contracting of
state debt without a referendum of the people.40 9 That constitution
further provided that the credit of the state "shall not, in any manner,
be given or loaned to, or in aid of any individual, association or cor-
poration." 410 This prohibition was absolute; even a vote of the people
could not authorize the use of state credit for such purposes. The 1938
Convention expressly expanded this provision to prohibit the use, with
limited exceptions, of state credit in aid of a public corporation as well
as a private one.411
It is apparent that the HFA guarantee violates both the constitu-
tional referendum requirement and the prohibition on the gift or loan
405 A less substantial constitutional violation is found in the HFA annual report
section. N.Y. Piuv. Hous. Fio. LAw § 56 (McKinney 1962). It provides for an annual re-
port 'to be submitted to the Governor setting forth the agency's "receipts and expendi-
tures ... in accordance with the categories or classifications established by the agency."
The constitution provides, however, that the accounts of a public corporation "shall be
subject to the supervision of the state comptroller." N.Y. CONST. art. ,X, § 5.
406 N.Y. Pav. Hous. FiN. LAw § 47(1)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
407 Id.
408 Reilly & Schulman, supra note 381. The authors note that real estate bonds
"without the state guarantee were considered poor by the bond market." Id. Since 'the
HFA bonds were accepted by the bond market, it is reasonable to assume that investors
believed they had the state' guarantee. See. note 247 supra.
409 N.Y. CONsr. art. VII, § 12 (1846).
410 Id. § 9.,
411 N.Y. CoNsT. art. VII, § 8. •.
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of state credit. It also violates the section discussed above which pro-
vides that the state shall not "at any time be liable for the payment of
any obligations" issued by a public corporation "nor may the legislature
accept, authorize acceptance of or impose such liability upon the
state."4
12
A further unconstitutionality occurs when the HFA guarantee
provision is read in conjunction with the state's purportedly irrepeal-
able agreement not to limit or alter the rights of the agency until the
bonds are paid off. Again, the constitution provides that any law creat-
ing a corporation "may be altered from time to time or repealed. '41
The state guarantee of HFA bonds therefore violates no less than
four constitutional provisions. An act whose essential provisions-state
guarantee, tax exemptions, and general irrepealability-are unconstitu-
tional must fall as a whole.414
412 Id. art. X, § 5. This section was expressly designed to prohibit any state or city
liability for authority debt. From time to time the people have approved specific amend-
ments that have created exceptions to this prohibition. Id §§ 6-8; id. art. XVII, § 7.
No specific amendments have been proposed or adopted with respect to the HFA or the
Urban Development Corporation.
413 Id. art. X, § 1.
414 The Supreme Court has noted:
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed.
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
As has been shown, practically all statutes creating authorities provide a disclaimer
to the effect that the authority debt shall not be a debt of the state and that the
state shall not be liable for the authority's bonds. Despite the work of the 1938
Convention, it has recently been said that the "moral obligation" of the state under-
lies authority debt. See, e.g., N.Y. DEP'T OF AUDIT & CONTROL, supra note 286, where
Comptroller Levitt stated:
Two other methods of financing or acquiring capital facilities have been
used in recent decades: (1) lease-purchase arrangements, such as have been used
in connection with certain state office buildings; and (2) the creation of public
corporations [authorities] with independent borrowing powers. I am convinced
that the State is making excessive use of them at present. The financial com-
munity regards the obligations created through these methods of financing as
carrying the moral commitment of the State.
See also N.Y. DEP'T OF AUDIT & CONTROL, 1967 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COIPTROLLER 21,
23 (1967); TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, REPORT: STATE
FINANCES 80, 172-73 (1967); TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION, supra note 377, at 51. The financial community appears confident that the state
will "bail out" the bonds of a defaulting authority. Comptroller Levitt has expressed
this view as follows:
The moral obligation derives from the language of pertinent laws, the ex-
pressions of the financial community regarding these obligations, and the use
to which the funds are put. The applicable laws generally provide that the State
will apportion to the various debt service reserve funds or rental reserve accounts
the amounts necessary to assure that the funds will be sufficient to meet the im-
mediate debt service needs. These payments are permissive, rather than manda-
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Recently, a new feature has been added to authority financing in
an effort to further insulate it from constitutional requirements. The
use of lease-financing in New York has also been credited to John
Mitchell, 415 but the origins of this financing method may be traced to
the nineteenth century.416 Its purpose is the same as that of an authority
-to evade referendum requirements at the state level and debt limita-
tions at the local level. Unlike a typical authority, however, it can be
used for completely non-self-supporting projects.
A lease-financing operation is quite simple. An authority under-
takes to construct a facility needed by government. Prior to construc-
tion, the authority, which will own the facility, enters into a long-term
lease with the state or city. The authority, with the governmental lease
as security, issues bonds and with the proceeds constructs the facility.
With the lease payments the authority pays the debt service on its
bonds. At the end of the lease term, title to the facility is transferred to
the state or city for little or no consideration. The state or city pays
annually as "rental" an amount equal to the debt service incurred by
the authority and other of its expenses.
Clearly, the state or city credit-in the form of the lease-is what
underlies the transaction.417 The bondholders, for practical purposes,
tory, since they are subject to annual Legislative appropriation. However, in the
words of a major bond rating service, "it is expected that the State of New York
will remain at all times under strong moral suasion to maintain its schedules
of charges and programs of aid to the end that these bonds will remain in good
standing."
N.Y. DEP'T or AUDIT & CONTROL, 1967 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CoriPTROLTER 23 (1967).
And although the Comptroller characterizes the state payments as "permissive, rather
than mandatory," we have seen that the statutes providing for such payments are un-
equivocal and mandatory. Proponents of the moral obligation view should read Article X,
§ 5, and the 1938 Convention debates.
415 A recent article states:
Mitchell's former law partners credit him with devising the scheme called
"lease-financing," under which a municipality whose borrowing powers are restricted
sets up a quasi-public corporation to build facilities, then lease[s] them back for
public use.
Viorst, Attorney General Mitchell's Philosophy Is "The Justice Department Is an In-
stitution for Law Enforcement Not Social Improvement," N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1969,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 70.
416 See Smith v. City of Newburgh, 77 N.Y. 130 (1879).
417 The South Mall project is a major example of lease-financing. The project site
was acquired by the state which then conveyed it to Albany County. Albany County
leased the site back to the state (for a 40-year term) and also agreed to issue county
bonds to cover the cost of construction. The state "rental payments to the county are
calculated to reduce county bond obligations progressively over the lease period." Schuyler
v. South Mall Constructors, 82 App. Div. 2d 454, 456, 303 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (3d Dep't
1969). By the end of the lease term, all of the county bonds will be retired and the
buildings and site will be reconveyed to the state. The appellate division has recently
summarized the reality of this transaction as follows:
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have no other security. The foreclosure and sale of a hospital or educa-
tional facility is not likely to recover the cost of construction.. Similarly,
the massive South Mall state office building project would not bring a
great deal at auction. If the transaction is premised upon government
credit, it must be said that government has incurred a debt. The
scheme's success depends upon a judicial determination that the pay-
ments are in fact rent and not a form of debt payment, but that appears
unlikely.418
It is no doubt true in a normal lease transaction that rent due in a
future period is not an existing obligation or debt, but New York
courts have not applied this rule. in the case of lease-financing. Rather,
they have looked at the realities of the situation. For example, in 1871
the city of Newburgh entered into a "lease" to acquire land needed for
the city's reservoir system. State law had authorized the city to enlarge
and improve its water system and to levy taxes for that purpose.419 The
law, however, provided that any "expenditure of money" in excess of
$10,000 must be approved by a referendum of the taxpayers. The
"lease," which was not approved by referendum, provided for "rental"
payments of $1,500 per year for the first ten years and $2,500 per year
for the next ten years. The city possessed an option to purchase, at any
time, for $30,000. In no one year, then, would the "lease" payments
exceed the prohibited $10,000 amount, but if the aggregate "lease"
payments were considered as a present obligation the transaction would
involve $40,000 and would be in violation of the law. In Smith v. City
of Newburgh,420 the Court of Appeals held the "lease" to be illegal since
no referendum was held and "the obligation incurred at the time was
[N]o use or expenditure of funds by the locality [Albany County] is actually
involved and the entire operation is underwritten by a State indemnification
against any "local" loss or expense. Investors in county bonds rely on the State's
credit which stands behind the rental and indemnity provisions of the South
Mall agreement.
Id. at 457, 303 N.Y.S2d at 904.
418 An excellent article on the subject states:
It seems apparent that lease-financing is actually borrowing by another name.
To contend that the method of payment.alters.the.fact of.payment strains ratioci-
nation. Unlike ordinary leases, these leases are in practice non-terminable, nor do
the parties ever intend to terminate them. The amounts paid as "rent" are not
the use value of the property, as true rent would be, but equal debt amortization
charges on the full cost of the facility financed.
Magnusson, Lease-Financing by Municipal Corporations as a Way Around Debt Limita-
tions, 25 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 377, 390 (1957) (footnote omitted).
419 Act'of March 16, 1867, ch. 88, [1867] N.Y. Laws 124.
420 77,N.Y.,l30 (1879).
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in excess of the sum named [$10,000]."421 Lease-financing cannot suc-
ceed in the New York courts unless Newburgh is overruled.422
In view of Newburgh, it is doubtful that the New York courts will
support the "rental" characterization, and in the 1964 case of Marine
Midland Trust Co. v. Village of Waverly,423 the New York courts have
indicated that Newburgh will be followed and that the reality of the
situation will control. There, a twenty-year "lease" with an option to
purchase at the end of the term for $1.00 was held to be an installment
purchase rather than a lease. The transaction was void since the village
had no authority under the Local Finance Law to make an installment
purchase.424
421 Id. at 134.
422 Reasoning similar to Newburgh was adopted by a federal circuit court in
Coulson v. Portland, 6 Fed. Cas. 629 (No. 3,275) (C.C. Ore. 1868). The charter of the
city of Portland provided that the indebtedness of the city "shall never exceed in the
aggregate the sum of fifty thousand 'dollars" and that any debt or liability in excess of
such amount shall be "null and void." Id. at 635. The city entered into an agreement
with the Oregon Central Railroad Company providing (1) that the city, at various
stages of the railroad's construction, would undertake the payment of the interest coupons
on specified amounts of railroad bonds (the city was not to be liable for the principal),
and (2) that the railroad would provide, for 20 years, free transportation for the city's
public messengers and for all stone, gravel, and lumber needed for construction of public
buildings. The opinion contains no estimate of the value of this consideration coming
from the railroad. However, the city's assumption of liability was dearly valued at
$300,000. The'bonds in question were for a term of 20 years and the city intended to
raise the money required for interest by levying taxes as the coupons became due. A
taxpayer sought to enjoin the transaction, claiming, among other things, that it ex-
ceeded the city's debt limit. The city defended, making the odd argument that no debt
was incurred because provision was made for the levying of taxes as the coupons fell
due. The circuit court, in rejecting the city's argument, stated:
By means of such artificial reasoning and unlooked for construction of popular
and plain terms and phrases, constitutions may be purged of every prohibition
upon the legislative power of taxation and creating indebtedness, which the wis-
dom or fears of the people may place in them.
These constitutional provisions restraining the creation of public debts are
the gradual outgrowth of the last twenty or thirty years. They have been erected
by the peoples of various states as barriers against the creation of debt by the
legislature in a time of popular excitement about internal improvements ...
... A debt exists against the city whenever the city agrees to pay money in
return for services or for money borrowed.
Id. at 636-37.
The court held the transaction void as an attempt "to create a debt against the
city exceeding $50,000." Id. at 637. Therefore, as in Newburgh, the court found that the
entire obligation was incurred at the time the agreement was made.
423 42 Misc. 2d 704, 248 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1963), af'd mem., 21 App. Div. 2d
753, 251 N.YS.2d 937 (3d Dep't 1964).
424 The court noted:
Article VIII of the New York Constitution and the provisions of the Local
Finance Law are part of the effort to create and maintain fiscal integrity. To
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Lease-financing is simply state or local debt by another name and
it too is unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The reader will recall that at a critical point during the 1938 Con-
vention, Comptroller Tremaine came to the support of the Moffat
amendment because he feared that the state would become financially
responsible for the failure of weak authorities. 425 The Comptroller's
thought was fairly clear: there is relatively little danger to the state
treasury in the case of a strong authority holding a vital or valuable
asset. The Triborough Bridge and the Port Authority tunnels are
good examples. If the bondholders are obliged to foreclose, they will
secure a revenue-producing asset which will pay off their debt; no
recourse to the state treasury is needed. But if authorities undertake
projects of "doubtful earning power," a very distinct threat to the state
or city treasury is posed. As Al Smith pointed out, "A sewer never can
be made a self-liquidating project." 42 6
allow the agreement in question to stand would be a clear evasion of the Con-
stitution and statutes of this State. Such methods of evasion are not uncommon
throughout the country and the weight of authority strikes these agreements down.
Id. at 707, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
The court relied on an earlier case, Gardner v. Town of Cameron, 155 App. Div.
750, 140 N.Y.S. 634 (4th Dep't 1913), aff'd mem., 215 N.Y. 682, 109 N.E. 1074 (1915). In
that case the town entered into a lease for a steam roller. The town undertook to pay
"rent" of $10 per day and agreed to use the steam roller for a minimum number of
days. The lease provided for a five-year term but the town could terminate it at the
end of each year. At the end of the five-year term the town would take title to the steam
roller for $1.00. The court held that "in substance and effect" the instrument was not
a lease but a conditional contract of purchase. Id. at 756, 140 N.Y.S. at 639. The court
noted: "This contract upon its face bears the evidence of having been drawn for the
purpose of subverting the declared policy of the State ... " Id. at 757, 140 N.Y.S. at 639.
425 Text accompanying note 315 supra.
426 III 1938 RavisED RECORD 2287. See note 279 supra.
The distinction drawn by Smith involves the difference between taxation and an
optional use. A sewer must be used by all of a city's citizens; charges in that case can
only be characterized as taxation. This would be true of most normal governmental
facilities such as schools, hospitals, and police departments. A charge for an optional
use means that the user has other options but because of increased convenience or what-
ever, he chooses to pay a toll for the use of an authority facility. An example would be
the New Jersey Turnpike, constructed by an authority, which is more convenient to
use than the pre-existing highway system. Smith would consider such an authority to
be legitimately self-supporting. When, however, an authority secures a monopoly posi-
tion this distinction fails. If travel between two points must be over an authority
facility, the authority has a monopoly. The use of its facility is optional only if travel
between two points is optional. But, it is impossible, as a practical matter, to travel by
car between New York City and Ndw Jersey except by use of a Port Authority bridge
or tunnel. The Port Authority tolls consequently should be considered as taxes. Since
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Beginning in 1960, however, authorities became involved in
projects that were only marginally self-supporting (subsidized middle-
income housing)42 7 and others that were clearly not self-supporting in
any normal sense of the term (hospitals,42 educational facilities,429 and
dormitories430). But how can the bonds of a weak authority be sold?
If the authority's asset is insufficient security for a bondholder what
will make the bonds marketable? Clearly, only governmental credit
in one form or another. Equally clearly, the constitution prohibits this
use of the state's credit.
Authorities are created only for antidemocratic purposes-the
evasion of rules that apply to government itself. At present, authority
debt exceeds state debt by more than two and a half times. Authorities
constitute a separate government, wealthier than the constitutional
government and not responsible to the people or the people's represen-
tatives. Their power serves to subvert the state's constitution. Since it
is apparent that authorities cannot be adequately controlled or regu-
lated, their functions should be returned to the constitutional govern-
ment.
1938, the constitution has prohibited the creation of an authority with both the power
to contract debt and to levy taxes. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. Since every authority con-
tracts debt, this provision amounts to a prohibition on granting an authority the power
to tax. If an authority's tolls or charges are in fact taxes, the constitution is violated.
Also, it should be pointed out that government has far more regulatory power over
private utilities than over authorities. If a private utility is given a monopoly position,
government always retains the power to regulate rates, among other things. An authority
can set its tolls as it wishes.
427 Housing Finance Agency Act, ch. 671, [1960] N.Y. Laws 1945.
428 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 4401-17 (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.Y. PRV. HOUS. FIN.
LAW § 47-d (McKinney Supp. 1970) (Health & Mental Hygiene Facilities Improvement
Corporation).
429 N.Y. Psuv. Hous. FIN. LAw § 47-c (McKinney Supp. 1970) (State University Con-
struction Fund).
430 Id. These functions would normally be considered governmental. Concurrently,
at the other extreme, authorities have moved into traditionally free enterprise ventures
such as commercial office buildings and luxury housing. E.g., the World Trade Center
(N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 6601-18 (McKinney Supp. 1970)) and the Battery Park City
Authority (N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LANw §§ 1970-88 (McKinney 1970)).
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